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RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN BY
REPEAL OF THE MINING LAW OF 1872
Shelby D. Green*
"Property is nothing but a basis of expectation

...

Jeremy Bentham
I.

INTRODUCTION

The "sale" of public lands has continued for more than a century.' Any citizen holding a mining claim on a parcel of public land
can purchase absolute title to the land' for as little as $2.50 an acre.,
This price has not been changed since 1872. The price and policy
were originally determined at a time when this country, and in particular the West, held pristine and seemingly boundless wilderness
areas, such that encouraging the settlement of the West and the discovery and development of mineral resources seemed to be sound
policy. 5 For most of the last 100 years, land titles obtained through
* Associate Professor, Pace University School of Law; J.D., Georgetown University Law
Center; B.S., Towson State University.
1. JEREMY BENTHAM. THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 68-69 (Richard Hildreth ed. & Etienne Dumont trans., Oceana Publications 1975) (1864).
2. In the last century, the United States has sold over 3.2 million acres of land under the
patent provisions of the 1872 General Mining Law, an area the size of the State of Connecticut. 137 CONG. REC. S2015 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1991) (statement of Sen. Bumpers). Between
1980 and 1990, the Bureau of Land Management issued 657 patents, for a total of 4,752
claims, covering approximately 179,915 acres. Id. (statement of Sen. Bumpers). The United
States government still owns 725 billion acres of land, over 50% of which is located in Alaska,
and more than 90% of the remaining lands located in 11 western states. PUBLIC LAND LAW
REVIEW COMMISSION. ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND 22 (1970).
3. General Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1988). "Except as otherwise provided, all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States .. .shall be free
and open to exploration and purchase .
Id. § 22.
4. Id. § 37.
5. See John A. Humbach, Law and a New Land Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REV. 339 (1989).
The author states that:
[T]he main policy thrust into the early 20th Century was to transfer land from
federal ownership to private individuals, developers and selected industries such as
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this policy came without any burdens to the new owners as preserva-

tion or reclamation efforts were not required, but also without much
benefit to the previous owner, except for the satisfaction of furthering a national policy.' The new owners became vested with most of
the traditional incidents of absolute ownership of property, including
the right of possessing, excluding others, and enjoying the fruits and
profits derived from the extraction and exploitation of valuable mineral deposits.' There was no thought of preserving the then viewed

limitless natural environment 8 or of increasing the then known limited treasury.'
railroads .... [The goals for the land transfers were] largely left to the new owners
and developers, and the workings of the free marketplace ....
...Congress clearly believed the vast public domain would be more valuable to the
growing nation if it were transferred to the hands of those who could develop it.
There was no detailed plan for development prepared by economists, scientists, or
anyone else .... The main guidelines appear to have been that the lands should be
settled rapidly, at little or no cost to settlers, and that the new ownership should be
predominantly private and widely distributed.
Id. at 340 (quoting COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY. THE SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY 33, 35, 38 (1985)).
6. gee infra note 21 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
8. See California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 587 (1987).
9. In 1880, the first Public Land Commission reported to President Hayes that it cost
the government four times more to transfer title to the land than was received from the miner
as a patenting fee. See Michael McCloskey, The Mining Law of 1872, in THE MINING LAW
OF 1872: A LEGAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 1 (1989).
In 1974, the General Accounting Office ("GAO") reported that the government received
about $12,000 for 41 mineral patents for land having a fair market value of more than $1
million. See 137 CONG. REC. S2015 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1991) (statement of Sen. Bumpers).
Government appraisers and local real estate brokers estimated the value of land sold between

1980 and 1990 to be from $200 to $200,000 an acre. U.S.
1872

FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT: THE MINING LAW OF

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE.
NEEDS REVISION (1989). Of 20

patented lands studied, the GAO found that the government received less than $4,500 for
lands valued between $14 million and $48 million. Id. A recent scandal as reported in the
Congressional Record gives some additional reasons for concern:
[The Oregon Dunes National Recreation Area] is located on the beautiful southwestern, coast of Oregon and is a popular tourist destination. In 1989, BLM [(the
Bureau of Land Management)] announced its intention of issuing a patent for an
uncommon variety of sand on claims covering over 700 acres in the heart of the
National Recreation Area. Although the Material Disposal Act of 1947 and the
Common Varieties Act of 1955 had effectively precluded the location and patent of
claims for sand and gravel, the claimants relied on an exception in the law for uncommon varieties. Six of the State's seven Congressmen wrote to the Secretary of
the Interior requesting that the patent not be issued. The Secretary issued the patent. After much public consternation regarding the possibility of a major sand quarrying enterprise in one of Oregon's most popular scenic areas, the claimants let it be
known that they would be open to trading their claims for suitable land else-

19931

RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

The "inexhaustible" quantity of rich and easily accessible deposits of ore led to the creation of huge multi-national entities seeking to yield low-grade and diffuse deposits.1" These entities almost
entirely eclipsed the lone, relentless frontiersman picking and panning in the golden western sunset.1" Only after nearly fifty years of
sometimes thoughtless, often ruthless, mining did it occur to the federal government that the public domain, like the resources hunted,
could be irreversibly depleted and exhausted, and that streams could
be degraded, wildlife habitats destroyed, and aquifers polluted. 2 It is
of public dollars will be needed to reclaim
now feared that billions
13
these public lands.
Congress has revealed its second thoughts about the terms of
the General Mining Law of 1872 and has considered its repeal on
several occasions.1 4 In 1993, various bills were voted out of commitwhere-if the price were [sic] right. The Forest Service and BLM undertook to find
lands of equal value for exchange outside the boundaries of the recreation area. The
patented land is valued at $350,000 to $750,000, but the owners believe the site's
potential mineral value is about $12 million. Since the claimants obtained the patented land for the 1872 mining law price of $5 an acre-about $1,950 total-it is
no wonder that this incident has become known as sandscam.
137 CONG. REC. S2015-16 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1991).
Currently, miners pay no royalties to the United States government for any minerals extracted from public lands. In 1989, the total value of non-fuel mineral production in the
United States was $32.3 billion. Id. S2016. It is estimated that between $3.9 billion and $6.1
billion of the total is derived from public lands. Id.
10. See McCloskey, supra note 9, at 4-5.
11. The United States Geological Survey studies show that small miners represent only
one percent of the total. See generally MANAGEMENT OF FUEL AND NON-FUEL MINERALS IN
FEDERAL LAND (Office of Technology Assessment ed., 1979); McCloskey, supra note 9, at 13
(testimony of Mr. McCloskey before the House Interior Subcommittee on Mining and Natural
Resources, June 23, 1987).
12. The first act to halt the depletion of certain resources was the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1920. 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1988). While the Forest Service Organic Act of 1897 gave the
Forest Service the authority to regulate mining activities to prevent "undue degradation" or
damage to surface resources, it was not until 1974 that the Forest Service promulgated any
regulations. 16 U.S.C. §§ 475, 551 (1988).
13. The General Accounting Office has found that more than 420,000 acres in eleven
western states are yet unreclaimed because of mining activity including the pile-up of mining
wastes and the contamination of rivers, lakes and soil by cadmium, nickel, lead, mercury, and
arsenic. 137 CONG. REC. S2017 (citing U.S. General Accounting Office, An Assessment of
Hardrock Mining Damage, April 1988). Of this amount, more than 280,000 unreclaimed
acres relate to abandoned, suspended, or unauthorized mining operations. Id. "Over [one hundred] sites on the Superfund national priority list are mining related and the cost for cleaning
up these sites could reach billions of dollars." Id. (quoting Bureau of Mines, The Mineral
Position of the United States 37 (1989)).
14. One of the first attempts at reform was the recommendation of the Public Land
Commission in 1880 that the Mining Law be completely rewritten. JOHN D. LESHY. THE MINING LAW. A STUDY IN PERPETUAL MOTION 2 (1987). In 1920, most fuel and fertilizer miner-
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tee in both houses of Congress.15 All of these bills would preserve the
idea of a mining claim as a property right, but, in return, would
significantly qualify and redefine the rights inhering in the mining
claim. Certain provisions would condition the existence of the right
on the production of commercial ore and assess a fee for the right's
acquisition and retention; withdraw the right to obtain a patent to
any lands in the public domain, even based on existing mining
claims; and impose substantial economic burdens and environmental
protection and reclamation requirements upon existing mining
claims. 6 The proposed changes most significantly raise the question
of an unconstitutional taking of property and the extent to which
Congress can qualify or redefine these property interests without the
concomitant obligation of making just compensation to the owners.
Part II of this paper offers an analysis of the new allocation of
burdens and benefits in the use of public lands as contemplated by
the proposed legislation. In Part III, I discuss the acquisition of
property rights under the General Mining Law of 1872. In Part IV,
the theory of property in general is explained along with the types
and nature of property interests inhering in, and arising from, a mining claim. I explain the recent efforts in Congress to reform the mining law in Part V and the concept of a taking of property in general
in Part VI. I discuss the idea of a taking by redefinition in Part VII
and in Part VIII, I deal with the question of whether the proposed
legislation effects an unconstitutional taking of property. Conclusions
are offered in Part IX.

als like oil, gas, and oil shale were no longer covered by the Mining Law, but instead, came
within the purview of the Mineral Leasing Act. Id. In 1922, a reform proposal was made by
the federal Bureau of Mines and the Mining Metallurgical Society of America. Id. at 3. The
major miners requested better security of title, more protection against nuisance locators and
less red-tape. Id. The prospectors perceived this proposal as a means of denying them access to
federal lands. Id. In the end, the prospectors won and the reform bill never emerged from
committee. Id. A number of reform measures were introduced in Congress every year between
1970 and 1978, but all such efforts proved unsuccessful. Id. at 67. The recent revival of interest in mining law reform, however, can be explained in part by the need for a framework for
hardrock mineral development more consistent with contemporary environmental values and
imperatives. See generally John D. Leshy, Reforming the Mining Law: Problems and Prospects, 9 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1 (1988).
15. The most substantial of these bills was H.R. 322, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
(also known as "The Mineral Exploration and Development Act of 1993").
16. See infra notes 158-68 and accompanying text.
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II.

RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
ACQUIRING PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER THE GENERAL MINING

LAW OF

1872

Under the General Mining Law of 1872,'" any citizen is free to
explore the public lands in the hope of discovering valuable minerals
(gold, silver, lead, copper and zinc) and to obtain title to the parcel
of land in which such minerals are found.18 The original purpose of
this overture was to encourage risk-takers to explore, discover, and
develop both known and unknown mineral deposits for the general
good and to settle the western United States. 19 It was thought that,
where agricultural land was connected with mining lands, the miner
would make improvements, cultivate the land, and raise crops, as
well as mine." The desired result would be a more settled community that would protect the western frontier and facilitate the production of food and resources for the national good."
17. 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1988).
18. Id. See generally George E. Reeves, The Origin and Development of the Rules of
Discovery, 8 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1973). The law makes a distinction between "lode"
mining claims, in which the valuable minerals occur in a vein held in place by the surrounding
rock, and "placer" claims in which valuable minerals are loosely held in the general earth. 30
U.S.C. §§ 23, 35. The distinction is important in that the technical location requirements vary
depending on the type of claim. 30 U.S.C. § 23. The statute also places a twenty-acre limit on
any mining claims, although no limit is placed on the number of claims an individual may
hold. 30 U.S.C. § 35. However, placer claims located by associations of individuals may be as
large as 160 acres. 30 U.S.C. § 36. See generally Terry Noble Fiske, Rush to the Rockies:
Some Aspects of Mineral Development of Non-Fee Land, 17 KAN. L. REV. 225 (1969); Rodney D. Knutson & Hal G. Morris, Coping with the General Mining Law of 1872 in the 1980's,
16 LAND & WATER L. REV. 411 (1981); Mark Squillace, The Enduring Vitality of the General Mining Law of 1872, 18 ENVTL. L. REP. 10261 (1988).
19. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
20. Frank J. Barry, Discovery Under the Mining Laws, 8 ARIz. L. REV. 84, 89 (1966)
(citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 532 (1872) (statement of Rep. Sargent).
21. Id.; see also John C. Lacy, Historical Overview of the Mining Law: The Miner's
Law Becomes Law, in THE MINING LAW OF 1872: A LEGAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 13,
28, 34-35 (1989). Early prospectors simply took occupancy of public lands and adopted their
own rules for locating, holding and working their claims. Gradually, local customs and rules of
organized mining districts developed, and a few court decisions clarified the nature of a mining
claim. See I CURTIS H. LINDLEY. A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW RELATING To MINES
AND MINERAL LANDS § 41 (2d ed. 1903). The first treatment of mineral rights by the Continental Congress appeared in provisions for the sale of land by the government in the Northwest Territory in the Land Ordinance of May 20, 1787, which provided that "there shall be
reserved ... one-third part of all gold, silver, lead, and copper mines, to be sold, or otherwise
disposed of as Congress shall hereafter direct." The provision was, however, not adopted by the
Constitutional Convention. Lacy, supra at 16.
As the new nation expanded westward, the policy of public land management was to
convey lands to private ownership as quickly as possible without much thought of
retaining lands for any specific purpose. The first major departure from this practice
occurred in 1807 after the discovery of lead deposits in Missouri, Indiana Territory,
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A mining claim arises upon the discovery of "valuable mineral
deposits. ' 22 An explorer perfects his mining claim by staking it and
complying with the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements, such as recording notice of the claim. The claim then gives

the discoverer "the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all
the surface included within the lines of their locations' 2 , as against
all third parties except the United States. 26 Though the United
and Southern Illinois. At that time, through a series of enactments between 1807
and 1832, lead mines and salt springs in public lands were reserved from sale...
and a leasing system established. It wasn't long, however, before the experiment
proved to be a failure as the cost of administering the system far outstripped revenues. The system was abandoned by a series of acts authorizing sales of lead mines
and lands containing copper in 1846 and 1847.
Id. at 16-17 (footnotes omitted).
The gold rush of 1848 prompted the consideration of legislation by Congress in 1849 and
1850, although Congress failed to take any action to take control of the western mineral resources. Id. at 29. Meanwhile, local custom and state rules prevailed, though conflicts continued. Id. at 30. The first mining law was enacted in 1866. The Placer Act of 1870 corrected a
flaw of the 1866 Act by adding placer deposits into the category of minerals capable of being
patented. Id. at 40. As previously stated, the General Mining Law was then enacted in 1872.
Id. at 34, 40. Although history has demonstrated that mining has flourished best when the
property and minerals were distinguished from the ownership of the soil, the recommendation
of the Commissioner of Mineral Statistics was that the best policy for the United States would
be to sell the surface along with the mines to avoid conflicts. Id. at 38-40; see also LESHY
supra note 14, at 1-2.
Subsequent to the passage of the 1872 Act, state statutes continued to be important in a
variety of aspects. Some of these aspects included determining how claim boundaries were
monumented; what, if any, "discovery work" was required at the time of location; how notices
or certificates of location were posted and recorded; and how annual assessment labor was
documented. See ROBERT G. PRUITT. JR., DIGEST OF MINING CLAIM LAWS 5-13, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN MINING LAW FOUNDATION (1990).
22. 30 U.S.C. § 26. Under the "prudent man" test, a valuable mineral deposit is an
occurrence of mineralization of such quantity and quality as to warrant a person of ordinary
prudence in the expenditure of time and money in the development of a mine and the extraction of the mineral. The mineral deposit that has been found must have a present value for
mining purposes. The prudent man test is refined and complemented by the marketability test,
which requires a showing that the mineral can be extracted, removed, and marketed at a
profit. The marketability test reveals a claimant's intention to secure the land for the purpose
of mining a valuable deposit, and it identifies more objectively the factors relevant to a determination that a deposit is valuable. See generally Skaw v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 795, 801
(1983), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 854 (1988); Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 661 n.4
(1980); United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 602 (1968); Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U.S.
313, 322-23 (1905); Converse v. Udall, 399 F.2d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 1968); see also Reeves,
supra note 18, at 1;Carl J. Mayer, Comment, The 1872 Mining Law: Historical Origins of
the Discovery Rule, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 624 (1986).
23. See 43 C.F.R. § 3861.1-2 (1979).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1988).
25. While the claim offers the discoverer exclusive rights against third parties, rights
against the United States are "conditional and inchoate." See United States v. Etcheverry, 230
F.2d 193, 195 (10th Cir. 1965); Skaw v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 795, 800 (1983).
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States retains title to the land, the claim is otherwise segregated
from the public domain."
After the discovery of the "valuable mineral deposits" and upon
fulfillment of other regulatory requirements, a mining claimant becomes eligible to file an application for a patent.27 Claimants may
only apply for a patent where they have assumed the requisite degree of risk." Thus, to apply for a patent, expenditures on the claim
must reach $100 annually and at least $500 cumulatively.'9 This
concept and the requisite levels of expenditure have withstood more
30
than 100 years of our country's general economic development.
III.

THE IDEA OF PROPERTY

At the end of the eighteenth century, the high point of classical
liberal thought, the idea of property stood at the center of the conceptual scheme of lawyers and political theorists.3 1 One celebrated
theorist argued that:
Property is nothing but a basis of expectation; the expectation
of deriving certain advantages from a thing which we are said to

possess, in consequence of the relation in which we stand towards
it.
Now this expectation, this persuasion, can only be the work of

law. I cannot count upon the enjoyment of that which guarantees it
to me. It is law alone which permits me to forget my natural weakRights against the United States are governed by the doctrine of pedis possessio and the
Mining Law of 1872. 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54. Pedis possessio doctrine protects the locator's rights
as against all others during occupation and exploration. See Knutson & Morris, supra note 18,
at 425-26; James A. Finberg, Comment, The General Mining Law and the Doctrine of Pedis
Possessio: The Case for CongressionalAction, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1026, 1027-28 (1982). The
General Mining Law of 1872 restricts these protections by requiring that occupation be for the
good faith purpose of prospecting, mining, or processing operations. 22 U.S.C. § 612 (1988);
see also United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 602 (1968); United States v. Bagwell, 961
F.2d 290, 292 (9th Cir. 1992).
26. See Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336 (1963); St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650, 655 (1898); Freese v. United States,
639 F.2d 754, 757 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
27. 30 U.S.C. § 29; 43 C.F.R. §§ 3861.1-3864.1 (1988).
28. 30 U.S.C. §§ 28-29; 43 C.F.R. §§ 3851.1, 3861.2-2 to 3861.2-5 (1988).
29. 30 U.S.C. §§ 28-29; see also Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U.S. 48, 55 (1970)
(indicating that token assessment work does not substantially satisfy the requirements of section 28 of the General Mining Law of 1872).
30. See Hearings on H.R. 3866 Before the Subcomm. on Mining and Natural Resources, 137 CONG. REC. S2014, 2016 (Sept. 6, 1990) (statement of Cy Jamison, Director of
the Bureau of Land Management).
31. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII (J.
Roland Pennock & John Chapman eds., 1980).
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ness. It is only through the protection of law that I am able to
inclose a field, and to give myself up to its cultivation with the sure,
though, distant hope of harvest.
A feeble and momentary expectation may result from time to
time from circumstances purely physical; but a strong and permanent expectation can result only from law. That which, in the natural state, was an almost invisible thread, in the social state becomes
a cable.
As regards property, security consists in receiving no check, no
shock, no derangement to the expectation, founded on the laws, of
enjoying such and such a portion of good. The legislator owes that
greatest respect to this expectation which he has himself produced.
When he does not contradict it, he does what is essential to the
happiness of society; when he disturbs it, he always produces a proportionate sum of evil. 2

Bentham's notion that property is a basis of expectation, more
than the physical thing, but involving a group of rights inhering in
the person's relation to others with respect to the physical thing, is
largely reflected in the concept of private property in the United
States.3 This "liberal conception of property" holds that inhering in
all property are six traditional rights: (1) right to possess; (2) right
to exclude others, (3) right to use, (4) right to dispose of, (5) right to
34
enjoy the fruits and profits, and (6) right to destroy or injure.
Not every economic, social, or other interest or advantage is,
however, property. Property includes only those expectations or economic advantages which have a basis in law." An owner of property
expects the community to prevent others from interfering with his
actions, provided that these actions are not prohibited in the specification of his rights.3 6 For example, Bentham suggests that a person
who has killed a deer may develop an expectation that, although he
32. See BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 68-69. William Blackstone defined property as "that
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe." 2 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *2 (15th ed. 1809). That property
consists of "the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or
diminution, save only by the laws of the land." 1 Id. at *138.
33. See Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357 (1954);
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcoN. REV. 347 (Papers &
Proc. 1967).
34. See Margaret J. Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1988).
35. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979); United States v. Willow River Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
36. Demsetz, supra, note 33, at 347.
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may lose possession at the hand of a stronger rival, he should by law
be entitled to its recovery. 7
While first possession at the early point in our history served as
the original premise for property, others have since come to be accepted with equal force. For example, a person who has created an
intellectual or aesthetic work may develop certain expectations in relation to that work.3 8 Similarly, a person may develop an expectation
if she contracts for certain advantages, 9 or if she utilizes a variety of
government largess such as licenses, public land grazing rights, welfare benefits, and public land mining rights.4
A.

The Nature of a Mining Claim

Several types of property interests may be said to arise out of a
mining claim: a right of possession for unpatented mining claims
(which is defeasible upon failure to comply with applicable federal
and state laws); an equitable fee simple title arising in land, claims
on which a patent application has been filed and completed;' 2 a legal
fee simple title to the land within which the claim is founded after
issuance of a patent; and an opportunity to obtain a patent.43
1. Unpatented Mining Claim
An unpatented mining claim is regarded as a "unique form of
BENTHAM, supra note 1 at 69.
38. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918); see
also Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). John Locke's Labor theory is implicit in
this rule and seems to underlie our patent and copyright laws. See supra note 194.
39. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 502 (1987) ("prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment [the contract clause] was the primary constitutional check on state legislative
power").
40. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 745 (1964). In this
important work, Reich states that government largess has given rise to a distinctive property
law system. This system can be viewed from at least three perspectives: the rights of holders of
largess, the powers of government over largess, and the procedure by which holders' rights and
governmental power are adjusted. Id.
41. Benson Mining & Smelting Co. v. Alta Mining & Smelting Co., 145 U.S. 428, 430
(1892). Prior to the enactment of any formal legislation, the status of a miner on public land
was little better than that of a mere trespasser since, by local rules and customs, a miner could
acquire some nature of estate or interest in his claim. Duggan v. Davey, 26 N.W. 887 (Dakota
1886). The interest was nonetheless regarded as real property. See, e.g., Hughes v. Devlin, 23
Cal. 501 (1863); Merrit v. Judd, 14 Cal. 59 (1859). See generally CURTIS H. LINDLEY. LINDLEY ON MINES (3d ed. 1914); PAUL W. GATES. HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 699-763 (1968).
42. Benson. 145 U.S. at 430.
43. Id. at 431.

37.
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property," essentially, a "possessory right." 4 The unpatented claim
is
property in the fullest sense of that term .

. .

. The owner is not

required to purchase the claim or secure patent from the United
States; but, so long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws, his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent.45
As defined, an unpatented mining claim seems to be no more
than one of the incidents which inheres in title under the liberal conception of property. In operation, though, the unpatented mining
claim is more in the nature of other limited property rights, such as
a servitude-a "profit a prendre"-which gives its owner some interest in lands owned by another. 4' The owner of this "profit a prendre"
holds the right to use, but not possess, another's land by removing a
portion of the land or its products (such as gravel, minerals, and
timber). 47 A "profit a prendre" can be exclusive, giving the owner
the right to exclude everyone else from using the profit. 8
At the same time, the unpatented mining claim, at its inception,
seemed like a fee simple title because it included the right of possession, against even the United States and the general public. It was
held to be "exclusive;" locators of valid mining claims, or valid locations, obtained the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all
the surface included within the lines of the claim's location. 49 A
party who was in actual possession of a valid location could maintain
that possession and exclude everyone from trespassing thereon, and
no one was at liberty to forcibly disturb his possession or enter the
44. Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920); see also Wilbur v. United States ex
rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306 (1930).
45. Wilbur, 280 U.S. at 316-17; see also Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S.
334, 335 (1963); Black v. Elkhorn Mining Co., 163 U.S. 445, 449 (1896); United States v.
Etcheverry, 230 F.2d 193, 195 (10th Cir. 1965); Duguid v. Best, 291 F.2d 235, 240 (9th Cir.
1961).
46. See Black, 163 U.S. at 451-52.
47. In the United States, profits are generally governed by the same rules as casements.
See generally RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450, Special Note (1944).
48. Id.
49. Delmonte Mining & Milling Co. v. Last Chance Mining & Milling Co., 171 U.S.
55, 83 (1898). The use of the word "exclusive" denotes congressional intent that locators
should have the right to exclude the general public. Id. at 69. "Exclusive" is defined as
"[elxcluding or having the power to exclude, or prevent entrance, debar from possession, participation or use; ... limiting or limited to possession, control or use by a single individual,
organization, etc." Id. at 74 (citations omitted).
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premises. 50 The unpatented mining claim is completely alienable and
may be sold, transferred, mortgaged, and inherited without infringing upon any right or title in the United States. 1 The right of the
owner is taxable by the state and is "real property," subject to the
lien of a judgment recovered against the owner in a state or territorial court. 52
However, unlike a fee simple title, an owner of an unpatented
mining claim is limited in the purposes or uses to which she may put
her claim-the claim is limited to mining purposes only.6 3 A claimant may not use public lands for grazing, harvesting, or residential
purposes. 4 Instead, the mining claim gives the locator only the right
to explore for and extract minerals, and to purchase the land if there
has been compliance with the provisions of the statute. 5 "To hold
otherwise would permit the owners of a valid mining claim, with no
intention of purchasing the fee, to strip the surface of the land of all
of the valuable property and materials thereon to his own profit, and
50. Id.; Wilbur, 280 U.S. at 315-16. The right of mining claimants to exclude has since
been qualified. See infra notes 311-29 and accompanying text.
51. Wilbur, 280 U.S. at 316.
52. Id.
53. In United States v. Langley, 587 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Cal. 1984), the United States
brought an action for ejectment of persons occupying an unpatented mining claim located on
public land in the Shasta-Trinity National Forest. Id. at 1259. The government alleged that
the land at issue was part of the national forest and that the defendants, without right and in
trespass, had moved onto, lived on, and occupied the lands and had situated a cabin or other
structure on the land. Id. at 1259-60. The defendant argued that it had a valid mining claim
and, thus, the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of the surface within the lines of
location, and that the structures and buildings on the mining claims on the land were used in
connection with prospecting, mining or processing operations and uses reasonably incident
thereto. Id. at 1264. The court found that the defendant had engaged in mining operations
that would cause a significant disturbance on national forest land and that the maintenance of
a residence would require an approved plan of operations pursuant to the applicable regulations. Id. However, the court denied the motion for a permanent injunction. Id. at 1267. It
granted only an injunction against the maintaining of a residence and engaging in mining
activity without an approved plan of operations. Id.
54. In United States v. Etcheverry, 230 F.2d 193 (10th Cir. 1965), the United States
brought an action against the defendants to recover damages for alleged trespass on certain
lands of the public domain and to enjoin further trespass. Id. at 194. Defendants leased the
land from the owner of placer mining claims for grazing purposes and grazed cattle and sheep
on the land. Id. One question before the court was whether the owner of a valid mining claim
has the right to lease or to use the surface of the claim for the grazing of livestock not incident
to the mining operations. Id. The court answered in the negative. Id. at 195-96; see also Ickes
v. Virginia-Colorado Dev. Corp., 295 U.S. 639 (1935); Wilbur v. United States ex rel.
Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306 (1930); Clipper Mining Co. v. Eli Mining & Land Co., 194 U.S. 220
(1904); St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650 (1898); Belk v.
Meagher, 104 U.S. 279 (1881).
55. Etcheverry, 230 F.2d at 195.
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then to abandon the claim. ' 5 6 This limitation also means that if a
once profitable claim ceases to produce a "valuable mineral deposit"
according to the prevailing test,57 it may be said to have terminated.58 In light of the limited nature of this property interest, it
seems that the right of destroying or injuring was never afforded a
claimant. This conclusion seems to be required in light of a 1955
amendment to the mining law which provided that mining claims are
subject to regulations on use as may be adopted by the Secretary of
the Interior. 9
Under the General Mining Law, the owner of an unpatented
mining claim is free to extract for her own profit and enjoyment all
valuable minerals discovered. There are no charges, fees or royalties
assessed on any amount of ore extracted.
2.

Patented Claim

When a patent is issued, the mining claim is merged into the fee
estate in the soil; the patentholder acquires title to the entire land,
soil, and all minerals. 60 "It is the 'lands' in which mineral deposits
are found which are 'open to purchase.' It is 'land' claimed and located for valuable mineral deposits, which is the subject of the application for patent, and where a patent of the United States issues, it
is for the 'land,' at so much per acre."" Nothing in the mining law
limits or excepts from a patent those six rights inhering in a fee title
to land under the liberal conception of property."9 Indeed, from the
language of the statute, i.e., "[a]ny mining claim . . . shall not be
used, prior to issuance of patent therefor, for any purposes other
than prospecting, mining or processing operations and uses reasonably incident thereto,"' it follows that whereas a mining claimant is
restricted to using the claim for mining purposes, once the claimant
56. Id.
57. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
58. Mulkern v. Hammitt, 326 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1964) (public land should not be
allowed to become "perpetually encumbered and occupied by a private occupant just because,
at one time, he had there a valuable mine which has now been completely worked out"); see
also United States v. Zweifel, 508 F.2d 1150, 1156 n.5 (10th Cir. 1975) (even a continued
holding of the land for several years with little or no exploitation can raise a presumption that
the original claim has been destroyed); Bales v. Ruch, 522 F. Supp. 150, 153 (E.D. Cal. 1981);
Multiple Use, Inc. v. Morton, 353 F.Supp. 184, 190 (D. Ariz. 1972).
59. 30 U.S.C. § 21a (1988).
60. Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U.S. 392 (1885); Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S. 762 (1876).
61. Duggan v. Davey, 26 N.W. 887, 890 (Dakota 1886).
62. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
63. 30 U.S.C. § 612 (1988) (emphasis added).
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obtains a patent, she is free to use her property for any purpose,

6
including residential, recreational, farming, harvesting and grazing. '

It also follows that a patentholder may cease mining activities and

engage in any act otherwise harmful to the land, which might have
been prohibited in connection with a mining claim, except to the extent that such activities produce results which expose the
patentholder to liability rules applicable to all landowners. Courts
have affirmed the patentholder's right to use the land for non-mining
purposes.6"
The justification for this advantage lies more in history than in
logic, for the value of the right to engage in non-mining uses may be
greater than the fair return to the miner whose pre-patent mining
activities have conferred a benefit on society. As the historical accounts indicate, the original thought was that title to the land would
encourage settlement of the western frontier and agricultural pursuits.6 6 This is strong support for granting the patentholder a traditional fee title. If the patent conferred upon the holder a title with
use limitations, which were in addition to those imposed on all landowners, then the patent would have little value. It would be the same
as a mining claim. One advantage usually inhering in title that immediately comes to mind is security against other claimants. But this
is no advantage over owning a mere claim, since staking and recording a claim upon discovery of minerals gives this security. The claimant has the right of exclusive possession at least as to other miners
(although no property interest is secure against adverse possessors).
But the patentholder also has the right to exclude the government
and the public from all manner of interference save those pertaining
to all landowners. It appears that it was to encourage the settlement
of the western frontier that these advantages were originally granted
to patentholders.
3.

The Opportunity to Patent

Is the "opportunity" to obtain a patent to land that contains the
mining claim a property interest? Bentham offered that "property is
nothing but a basis of expectation; the expectation of deriving certain advantages from a thing which we are said to possess, in conse64.
150, 156
65.
66.

Silbrico Corp. v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1989); Bales v Ruch, 522 F. Supp.
(E.D. Cal. 1981).
Silbrico Corp., 878 F.2d 333.
See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
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quence of the relation in which we stand towards it."' 67 Consistent
with this conception, the Supreme Court has eschewed any "wooden
distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges,'" in favor of a definition
of a "property interest" that "extend[s] well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money."" The Court has recognized a
"purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those
claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must
not be arbitrarily undermined." 69 This means that there may be a
property interest in a government benefit to which one has come to
expect and upon which one has relied, although a person must have
more than a unilateral expectation of it.
The Supreme Court first articulated this principle in the context
of an employment relationship. In Perry v. Sindermann,71 an action
brought against a state governmental unit, the Court recognized that
the concept of a "'property' interest in re-employment, ' 7 1 "a legitimate claim of entitlement to job tenure ' 7 (at least for procedural
due process purposes) stems from "rules and understandings,
promulgated and fostered by [the employer]."" The Court explained
that
[a] written contract with an explicit tenure provision clearly is evidence of a formal understanding that supports a teacher's claim of
entitlement to continued employment unless sufficient "cause" is
shown. Yet, absence of such an explicit contractual provision may
not always foreclose the possibility that a teacher has a "property"
7
interest in reemployment. 4
Instead, "[e]xplicit contractual provisions' may be supplemented by
other agreements implied from 'the promisor's words and conduct in
the light of the surrounding circumstances.' ,,75
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972).
69. Id. at 577.
70. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
71. Id. at 601.
72. Id. at 602.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 601.
75. Id. at 602. The basis for the understanding was found in the employer's official
Faculty Guide, which included this provision:
[The] College has no tenure system. The Administration . . . wishes the faculty
member to feel that he has permanent tenure as long as his teaching services are
satisfactory and as long as he displays a cooperative attitude toward his co-workers
and his superiors, and as long as he is happy in his work.
Id. at 600.
67.
68.
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With respect to mining claims, the Supreme Court has held that
the right to purchase the land upon which a mineral location has
been made by the possessor is not an equitable fee-simple estate in
the premises," which arises only upon completion of the application
for patent and payment of applicable fees. However, under the liberal conception of property 77 and Perry, the "opportunity to patent"
may nonetheless be a legal property interest. The prospect of obtaining a patent upon discovery of minerals and before an application for patent is filed is not unlike an interest in continued employment because it, too, is not a mere unilateral expectation. Instead, as
in Perry, it is a "legitimate claim of entitlement" stemming from
rules and understandings-the mining law and custom. The mining
law invites miners to explore for minerals, offering to those who accept the venture and commit the required energies and capital not
only the exclusive possession of the value of any minerals discovered,
but also title to the land in which any minerals are found.7 8
It seems though, as discussed above, that in order for the offer
of a patent to have any meaning, the patent must be seen as conferring advantages much larger and different in nature than the right to
continue mining under a mining claim. No reason can be found in
the legislative history to explain this reward which is in addition to
the value of all minerals extracted and exclusive rights to extract
them, except as an inducement to undertake the mining effort and as
a furtherance of the national policy to populate and develop the
west. Considering these dual national objectives, the opportunity to
patent can be seen as a separate and distinct property interest, and
as one which is as much a vested interest as the mining claim itself.
The opportunity to patent, like the mining claim, is an advanIn addition, guidelines promulgated by the Coordinating Board of the Texas College and
University system provided that a teacher who had been employed as a teacher in the state
college and university system for seven years or more had some form of job tenure. Id.
However, "[p]roof of such a property interest would not, of course, entitle him to reinstatement. But such proof would obligate [the employer] to grant a hearing at his request,
where he could be informed of the grounds for his nonretention and challenge their sufficiency." Id. at 603; see also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (recognizing an enforceable
expectation of continued public employment in the state where the employer, by statute or
contract, has granted some form of guarantee); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (recognizing a "statutory expectancy" in continued employment in a civil service position).
76. Black v. Elkhorn Mining Co., 49 F. 549, 552-53 (C.C.D. Mont. 1892), aoffd, 163
U.S. 445 (1896) (citing Wirth v. Branson, 98 U.S. 118 (1878)); see also Hutchinings v. Low,
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 77 (1872); Frisbie v. Whitney, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 187 (1869).
77. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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tage and benefit of government largess, like grazing rights, licenses,
and welfare benefits, whose availability, by definition, is subject to

Congress' will, though not its whim. It is unquestionably within Congress' power to withdraw, at least prospectively, all public lands from

mineral exploration. In an important work, Charles A. Reich considered the general question of an individual's vested interest in the

continued enjoyment of government largess."9 He explained that "[a]
controversy over government largess may arise from such diverse situations as denial of the right to apply, denial of an application, attaching of conditions to a grant, modification of a grant already
made, [or] suspension or revocation of a grant ...."o According to
Reich, courts have generally afforded "the greatest measure of protection in revocation or suspension cases" on the theory that some
sort of rights have "vested." 8 1 Courts have given the least amount of
protection in denial of application cases where applicants have less at
stake, and varying amounts of protection, to cases lying between
these two extremes. 82 On the whole, Reich points out that "individual interests in [government] largess have developed along the lines

of procedural protection and restraint upon arbitrary official action,
[but] substantive rights to possess and use largess have remained
very limited."8 " This tenuous and conditional grant of protection
may be explained by the idea that "largess does not 'vest' in a recipient,"8' 4 the benefits remaining revocable without compensation and
subject to limitations on use as the public interest demands.8 5 Reich
79. Reich, supra note 40, at 741.
80. Id. at 744.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 744-45; see, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). The appellee in
Nestor was an alien who had become eligible for old age benefits under the social security
program in 1955 after having worked in the United States since 1936. Id. at 628-29 (Douglas,
J., dissenting). He was deported in 1956 under the Immigration and Nationality Act for having been a member of the Communist party from 1933 to 1939. Id. at 605. Since this was one
of the grounds specified in § 202(n) of the Social Security Act, the appellee's old-age benefits
were terminated. Id.
The question presented to the Court was whether a person eligible for social security
benefit payments had an "accrued property interest" in those payments, the taking of which
would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. The Court held that eligibility for social security benefit payments was not such an "accrued" property right, the "defeasance" of which could be considered a violation of Due Process. Id. at 611. In so holding,
the Court looked to the statutory scheme underlying the Social Security system and the purposes sought to be achieved by the Social Security Act. Id. at 608-11. The Supreme Court
reasoned that if Social Security benefit payments were to be considered "accrued property
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states:
Reduced to simplest terms, "the public interest" has usually
meant this: government largess may be denied or taken away if this
will serve some legitimate public policy. The policy may be one
directly related to the largess itself, or it may be some collateral
objective of government. A contract may be denied if this will promote fair labor standards. A television license may be refused if
this will promote the policies of the antitrust laws. Veterans benefits may be taken away to promote loyalty to the United States. A
liquor license may be revoked to promote civil rights. A franchise
for a barber's college may not be given out if it will hurt the local
economy, nor a taxi franchise if it will seriously injure the earning
capacity of other taxis.86
While most of these public interest objectives are laudable,
Reich points out that they ignore the existence of competing and
often conflicting policies and that the regulation of government largess to achieve a specific policy may undermine the independence of
the individual.87 Reich argues for a "zone of privacy for each individual beyond which neither government nor private power can
push."'8 8 This means that:
The presumption should be that the professional man will keep his
license, and the welfare recipient his pension. These interests
should be "vested." If revocation is necessary, not by reason of the
fault of the individual holder, but by reason of overriding demands
rights," the Social Security system would be deprived "of the flexibility and boldness in adjustment to everchanging conditions." Id. at 610. In fact, the Act contains a clause expressly
reserving to Congress the right to alter, amend or repeal any provision. Id. at 610-11. The
Congress, however, is not free from all constitutional restraint. An arbitrary governmental
action can be held to be violative of Due Process. Id. at 611. Here, in refusing to find a
violation of the appellee's Due Process rights, the Court reasoned that one of the underlying
purposes of the Social Security system was to increase the national purchasing power by providing benefit payments to the disabled and the elderly. See id. at 612. This purpose of the
system would be undermined if the payments were made to a person living abroad, as appellee
was after deportation. Id.
Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion, quoted a statement by Georgia Senator Walter F.
George, Chairman of the Finance Committee, regarding the benefit payments as "an earned
right based upon the contributions and earnings of the individual." Id. at 623 (quoting 102
CONG. REC. 15110 (1956)). The clause in the Act that gives Congress the "'right to alter,
amend, or repeal any provision' of the Act," id. at 611, according to Justice Black, meant that
the Act could "stop covering new people and even stop increasing obligations to its old contributors." Id. at 624. But, it could not disappoint the "just expectations of the contributors to the
fund." Id. at 624-25.
86. Reich, supra note 40, at 774.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 785.
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of public policy, perhaps payment of just compensation would be
appropriate. The individual should not bear the entire loss for a
remedy primarily intended to benefit the community.8 9
These concerns for individual autonomy identified by Reich are

perhaps not as compelling in the case of the mining claimant's opportunity to patent. Yet, while the statute requires a financial investment of a minimum of $500 to obtain a patent, the discovery of
valuable minerals may, in fact, require a substantially greater investment of energy and capital with the ever attendant risk that minerals
may never be found, such that a prospector never becomes entitled
to a patent. Though it is a calculated risk, the loss to the claimant is
real. And, in accordance with Reich's views on conflicting policies,
while the protection of the environment may well be the overriding
public policy that requires the mining claimant to yield, the withdrawal of the opportunity to patent would not further that end because a mining claim must be worked in order to remain a cognizable property interest,9 but a patented claim need not. 91 Hence, while
a mining claimant does not need a patent to continue mining, ironically, a claimant needs a patent in order to discontinue mining.
4.

Existing Uses and Valid Existing Rights

The opportunity to patent may be viewed as a "valid existing
right." Valid existing rights are often found in savings clauses of
subsequently enacted legislation providing that the new legislation
does not otherwise alter or eliminate rights already existing.9" Congress has consistently failed to state the precise purpose of any valid
existing right or savings clause; instead, it leaves the burden of inter89. Id.
90. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
91. See Multiple Use, Inc. v. Morton, 353 F. Supp. 184, 193 (D. Ariz. 1972) (citing
Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336 (1963)).
92. See, e.g., Mineral Leasing Act of 1988, 16 U.S.C. § 182 (1988); Alaska National
Interest Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 410hh-5 (1988); Multiple Use Mining Act of 1955, 30
U.S.C. § 612(b) (1988); Central Idaho Wilderness Act of 1980, 16 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (1988);
Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1988); Federal Land Policy Management Act
of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1701(b) (1988); Mining in the Parks Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1901 (1988).
Section 1910 of the Mining in the Parks Act provides:
The holder of any patented or unpatented mining claim subject to this chapter who
believes he has suffered a loss by operation of this chapter, or by orders or regulations issued pursuant thereto, may bring an action in a United States district court
'to recover just compensation, which shall be awarded if the court finds that such
loss constitutes a taking of property compensable under the Constitution.
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pretation to regulators and the courts.9 The Courts have held that a
determination of the existence and extent of valid existing rights requires a consideration of not only the language of the statute and
legislative history where the statute is silent, but also interpretations,
definitions and .understandings prevailing at the time the rights were
acquired.94 Using this analysis, some courts have interpreted valid
existing rights clauses to cover only uses then actually existing and
not those merely potentially existing at the time the rights were

acquired.9"
The recent decision in Seldovia Native. Ass'n v. Lujan96 is instructive on the interpretation of valid existing rights. The Alaska
93. See generally James N. Barkeley & Lawrence V. Albert, A Survey of Case Law
Interpreting "'Valid Existing Rights"--Implications for Unpatented Mining Claims, 34
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 9-1 (1988).
94. For example in Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 661 (1980), the Court decided the existence and scope of valid existing rights under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,
30 U.S.C. § 181 (1988), which withdrew oil shale and several other minerals from the General Mining Law of 1872 and provided that, thereafter, these minerals would be subject to
disposition only through leases. A savings clause, however, preserved "valid claims existent at
the date of the passage of this Act and thereafter maintained in compliance with the laws
under which [the Act was] initiated, which claims may be perfected under such laws, including discovery." Andrus, 446 U.S. at 659. It was argued that no claim was established under
the marketability test adopted after the Mineral Leasing Act. Id. at 660-61. The Court held
that the "present marketability" standard would not be used to determine whether a cognizable property interest arose. Id. at 672-73. Rather, the Department of Interior instructions,
which were issued just after the enactment of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, were the test
to be followed. Id. at 673.
95. In Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 999 (D. Utah 1979), "the United States 'filed
suit ... seeking a temporary restraining order to prevent Cotter Corporation . . . from engaging in any construction, road building, leveling land, or destroying primitive, scenic and wildlife characteristics on certain federal land.' "
Cotter Corporation (was] a uranium mining and exploration company wholly
owned by Commonwealth Edison, a public utility serving Northern Illinois ....
Cotter acquired ...federal claims ... located pursuant to the Mining Law of 1872
- . .Cotter conducted drilling operations on federal land to the north and to the
south of the lands at issue ....These operations indicated a "trend" of uranium ore
between the two drilling points ....Cotter constructed access roads ... but did not
notify BLM [(the Bureau of Land Management)] of the construction activity ....
[About six months later] Cotter began to construct a road across the land in question ... in order to further its exploratory drilling.
In the meantime, BLM proceeded with the inventory and wilderness area examination required by FLPMA [(Federal Land Policy and Management Act)] ....
BLM identified a portion of roadless unit UT-05-236 [(part of Cotter's federal
claim)] as being appropriate for designation as a Wilderness Study area.
Id. at 1000-01.
96. 904 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1990).
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Statehood Act 97 authorized the State of Alaska to select acreage
from public lands that were "vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved
at the time of their selection" and thereafter "to execute conditional
leases and to make conditional sales of such selected lands."" Pursuant to this authorization, the State created the "open-to-entry"
("OTE") program, under which individuals could lease up to five
acres of state land classified as OTE.9 9 The lessees were then granted
an option to purchase the land, which could be exercised after a survey of the land was conducted and the purchaser paid to the State
the fair market value of the lands as of the date of entry. 0 0 The
State issued OTE leases with conditional purchase options to the defendants in this case between 1968 and 1972,101 and "the Department of the Interior issued 'tentative approval' to the State only after
'determining that there [was] no bar to passing legal title .
"102
Thereafter, the Seldovia Native Association ("SNA") submit03
ted selections for lands, which came to include the OTE lands.1
The Bureau of Labor Management ("BLM") then "vacated its tentative approval of OTE lands and approved their conveyance to
SNA, subject to valid existing rights."'0 4 The decision "was appealed by SNA, the State, and several individual lessees to the
Alaska Native Claims Appeals Board" (the "Board"). 0 1 The Board
ruled that although the OTE leases were protected by the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act' 06 ("ANCSA"), the purchase options
'

97. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958) (codified as
amended at 48 U.S.C. Ch. 2 (1988)).
98. Seldovia, 904 F.2d at 1337-38 (quoting the Alaska Statehood Act, 48 U.S.C. Ch.
2, §§ 6(b), 6(g) (1988)).
99. Id. at 1338 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.077 (3), (7) (1968)).
100. Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.077(4) (1968)).

101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id. The initial selections by the SNA did not include the OTE lands, but "the

BLM notified SNA that SNA was required to select the OTE lands to ensure the 'compactness' of SNA's selection." Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629e (1988). ANCSA was enacted in 1971 to settle Alaskan
natives' aboriginal claims to the land and resources of Alaska. See id. § 1601. It provided that
all prior conveyances of land under federal law or under the Statehood Act operated to extinguish aboriginal title at the time of the conveyance and all remaining claims by Native Alaskans based on aboriginal right, title, use or occupancy of the land as of the effective date. Id.
§ 1603. In consideration for the relinquishment of claims based on aboriginal title, Congress
granted to Native Alaskans nearly $1 billion and 40 million acres of land. See id. §§ 1605,
1611. ANCSA established a process whereby land would be withdrawn from selection by the

1993]

RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

did not survive conveyance to Native Alaskans.10 7 The Board's order,
however, conflicted with an earlier decision of the Interior Board of
Land Appeals. 108 To resolve this conflict, the Secretary of the Interior issued an order concluding that conditional purchase options
were valid existing rights under ANCSA. 0 9 This meant that a
lessee's right to exercise a purchase option was enforceable against a
Native Village corporation such as SNA."0 The Secretary later
ruled that this should be applied retroactively to the OTE lands previously conveyed to SNA."' In the ensuing action, the District
Court accepted the Secretary's interpretation of valid existing rights
under ANCSA and granted summary judgment
for the federal de2

fendants and the individual defendants."

On appeal, SNA filed an action for declaratory relief seeking to
invalidate the construction of ANCSA as adopted by the Secretary
of the Interior" 3 because "[t]he Secretary's construction of ANCSA
validated the State of Alaska's grant of leases with purchase options
' 4
on land subsequently claimed by SNA pursuant to ANCSA." 1

Furthermore, SNA sought an injunction against further enforcement
pursuant
purchase
could be
The

to the invalid interpretation. " 5 SNA argued that the
options were not "valid existing rights" and, therefore,
extinguished under ANCSA." 6
Ninth Circuit first noted that Congress had not defined

"'valid existing rights" in the text of ANCSA." 7 The court then

State, made available for selection by Native Alaskans to fulfill their allotment, under
ANCSA, and then conveyed to Native Alaskans. See id. § 1603.
Section 1610 of ANCSA provides: "The following public lands are withdrawn, subject to
valid existing rights, from all forms of appropriation under the public land laws, including the
mining and mineral leasing law, and from selection under the Alaska Statehood Act, as
amended .... Id. § 1610. The effect of this provision was that the state could not grant OTE
leases under the Statehood Act after passage of ANCSA. However, rights previously granted
were protected as "valid existing rights." Seldovia, 904 F.2d. at 1340.
107. Seldovia, 904 F.2d at 1340.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id. A year and a half later, the Secretary had reconsidered his first order and
concluded that purchase options are valid existing rights under ANCSA § I l(a)(2), 43 U.S.C.
§ 1610(a)(2). Id.; see also Secretarial Order No. 3029 (S.O. 3029), 43 Fed. Reg. 55287
(1978).
112. Seldovia, 904 F.2d at 1337.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.at 1341.
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looked to the legislative history and found support for the conclusion
that conditional purchase options were "valid existing rights." 118 The
court noted that the Conference Report of the House and Senate
Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs stated that "[a]ll valid
existing rights, including inchoate rights of entrymen and mineral
locators, are protected."'1 9 In the court's view, a conditional
purchase option was an inchoate right. 120 However, because conditional purchase options were not expressly referred to in either the
statute or legislative history, the court turned to an examination of
21
the Secretary's construction of "valid existing rights" in general.1
The court found that the Secretary's construction was consistent
with other judicial interpretations of the statute. 22 For example, in
Aleknagik Natives, Ltd. v. United States, 28 the Ninth Circuit reviewed the Secretary's construction of "valid existing rights" under
the same section of ANCSA. The Secretary had determined that
townsite land in Alaska, which had been segregated but not yet subdivided and distributed, was not available for Native Alaskan selection under the Act.' 2 ' The court agreed, asserting that the municipalities had an entitlement to the lands under the townsite laws from
the time the lands were segregated from the public domain.12 5 The
court explained:
The term "valid existing rights" does not necessarily mean present
posses~ory rights, or even a future interest in the property law sense
of existing ownership that becomes possessory upon the expiration
of earlier estates. Legitimate expectations may be recognized as
valid existing rights, especially where the expectancy is created by
the government in the first instance. 126
Similarly, in Seldovia, the holders of conditional purchase options
had legitimate expectations arising out of the Alaska Statehood Act
and, according to the court, the leases issued pursuant to that Act
should be protected as "valid existing rights."' 2
118.
119.
Cong., 1st
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id. at 1341-42 (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 746, 92d
Sess. 4 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2192, 2250).
Id. at 1342.
Id.
Id.
806 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 926.
Id.
Id. at 926-27.
Seldovia, 904 F.2d at 1343.
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The Ninth Circuit found further support for its conclusion in
the Supreme Court's interpretation of a similar phrase in the context
of the federal homestead laws."2 8 In Stockley v. United States, 29 a
presidential order withdrew certain lands from appropriation under
the homestead laws, "subject to existing valid claims."' 13 0 The Court
found that a homesteader's lawful entry upon land was excepted
from this withdrawal order.' 3 ' The Stockley Court stated:
Obviously, this means something less than a vested right, such as
would follow from a completed final entry, since such a right would
require no exception to insure its preservation. The purpose of the
exception evidently was to save from the operation of the order
claims which had been lawfully initiated and which, upon full compliance with the land laws, would ripen into a title. 132
Thus, "[b]ecause the preliminary entry gave the entryman an exclusive right of possession, his inchoate right to proceed to patent was
protected."' 83 Thus, the Ninth Circuit, in Seldovia, stated that
"[j]ust like a homesteader's preliminary entry, the grant of a conditional purchase option ripens into title upon compliance with the
[State's] land laws.''
A clear sense of the Supreme Court's attitude about the rights
inherent in mining claims may be found in a case decided a few
years after Stockley. In Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic,'35
a claimant sought a writ of mandamus to compel the isshance of a
patent.' 3 6 In 1919, the respondent and seven associates located a
tract of land in Colorado under the name of Spad No. 3 placer
claim. 37 "The land contained valuable deposits of oil shale, and was
open to appropriation under the mining laws."' 3 8 Spad No. 3 formed
one of a group of six oil placer claims, all of which were located and
owned by the same persons and were adjacent to one another. 13 9 In
1920, Congress passed the Mineral Leasing Act, which withdrew
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
260 U.S. 532 (1923).
Id. at 536.
Id. at 544.
Id.
Seldovia, 904 F.2d at 1343 (citing Stockley, 260 U.S. at 544).
Id.
280 U.S. 306 (1930).
Id. at 316.
Id. at 315.
Id.
Id.
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public lands containing deposits of coal, phosphate, sodium, oil shale
and gas from mining exploration, and permitted only leases.14 However, the statute contained a savings clause protecting "valid claims
existent [at the date of the passage of the Act] and thereafter maintained in compliance with the laws under which initiated" and declaring that the claims "may be perfected under such laws, including
14 1
discovery.
Before 1921, the co-locators had already performed annual labor on three of the six claims amounting in value to more than $600,
with the intention that the labor should apply to all six claims. 42
The claimant subsequently acquired the interest of his co-locators in
Spad No. 3 and performed the required assessment work until the
aggregate value exceeded $500.14- On September 25, 1922, the
claimant applied for a patent, complied with the statutory requirements pertaining to the application process, and paid the purchase
price.' 4 ' Thereafter, a proceeding against the entry was instituted by
the Land Office, which then declared the claim null and void on the
ground of insufficient assessment labor for the year 1920.15 This
holding was affirmed by the Secretary of the Interior. 14" The claimant then applied for a writ of mandamus, which was denied by the
District Court, which decision was reversed by the Court of
Appeals." 7
The specific question before the Supreme Court was whether
the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 had the effect of extinguishing the
locator's right to save his claim under the original location by resuming work after his failure to perform annual assessment labor. 148 The
Court explained that "[w]hile [a claimant] is required to perform
labor of the value of $100 annually, a failure to do so does not ipso
140.

30 U.S.C. § 193 (1988) provides:

The deposits of coal, phosphate, sodium, potassium, oil, shale, and gas herein referred to, in lands for such minerals . . . shall be subject to disposition only in the
form and manner provided in this chapter, except as provided in sections 1716 and
1719 of Title 43, and except as to valid claims existent on February 25, 1920, and
thereafter maintained in compliance with the laws under which initiated, which
claims may be perfected under such laws, including discovery.
141. Id.

142.

Wilbur, 280 U.S. at 315.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 316.
Id.
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facto forfeit the claim, but only renders it subject to loss by relocation." 14 9 The Court further pointed out that "the law is clear that no
relocation can be made if work be resumed after default and before
such relocation." 1 50
This concession that "Spad No. 3 'as a valid claim existent on
February 25, 1920,' [left] only [the] question [of] whether, within
the terms of the excepting clause, the claim was 'thereafter maintained in compliance with the laws under which initiated.' " 51 The
Court believed the owner's resumption of work, after his failure to
do assessment work, meant a retention of the owner's claim except in
152
cases where the United States intervened to challenge the claim.
The Court stated:
"[The locator's] rights after resumption were precisely what they
would have been if no default . . . in . . . doing [the] assessment
[work had] occurred." Resumption of work by the owner, unlike a
relocation by him, is an act not in derogation, but in affirmance, of
the original location; and thereby the claim is "maintained" no less
than it is by performance of the annual assessment labor. Such resumption does not restore a lost estate ... it preserves an existing
15
estate. 1
This case is important not only for its instructive points on the
annual assessment requirements, but also for its consideration of the
import of the savings clause. The Court found that the savings clause
of the Act preserved existing mining claims and that a mining claim
gave not only the right to continue mining and extracting valuable
mineral deposits (including the fossil fuels otherwise withdrawn by
the Act), but also the right to obtain a patent to the land based on
these existing claims.'" This means that the "valid existing rights"
clause saved the mining claim as well as the right to apply for a
patent based on these claims.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
Fredlund,
154.

Id. at 317.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 317-18.
Id. at 318 (citing Belk v. Meagher, 104 U.S. 279, 283 (1881); Knutson v.
106 P. 200, 202 (Wash. 1910)) (emphasis added).
See Wilbur, 280 U.S. at 317.
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IV.

REDEFINITION OF MINING CLAIM UNDER THE PROPOSED
MINERAL EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1993

In 1872, the tone of the General Mining Law, 155 as well as the
government's attitude toward mining was one of laissez-faire; the
government left it largely up to claimants and patentholders to determine how mining operations would be conducted.' 5 Nearly fifty
years passed before Congress amended the General Mining Law or
enacted new laws to increase the role of the government in control157
ling the ways in which public lands were claimed and mined.
The most recent effort by Congress to control mining activities
is the proposed "Mineral Exploration and Development Act of
1993. ''15" The proposed A.ct restates the offer to any citizen to seek
minerals in public lands and preserves the explorer's exclusive right
of possession upon the location of valuable minerals.'65 The claim,
however, is deemed abandoned unless the claim holder continues to
maintain the sufficiency of the claim in accordance with the Act.1 60
Under the proposed Act, the taking on of the risk of exploitation is
no longer sufficient compensation to the United States for the use of
its land. Instead, the proposed Act requires that the claim holder
make certain payments to the Secretary. For example, under section
103(d)(3), a locator must pay a location fee of twenty-five dollars for
each unpatented mining claim located after the date of enactment of
155. 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1988).
156. Humbach, supra note 5, at 340.
157. Id.
158. H.R. 322, 103rd Cong., IstSess. (1993). H.R. 322 was passed in the House by a
316 to 108 vote. Also, currently under consideration is S.775, a more industry-friendly bill.
See S.775, 103rd Cong., IstSess. (1993).
159. H.R. 322, 103rd Cong., IstSess. (1993). Section 101(a) provides "that mining
claims may be located under this Act on lands and interests owned by the United States"
pursuant to the terms of the Act. Section 103(a) sets forth the rules for locating a mining
claim. Specifically, section 103(a) states "[a] person may locate a mining claim covering lands
open to the location of mining claims by posting a notice of location, containing the person's
name and address, the time of location ... and a legal description of the claim." Accordingly,
section 103(d)(1) provides that "[w]ithin 30 days after the location of a mining claim pursuant to this section, a copy of the notice of location referred to in subsection (a) shall be filed
with the Secretary in an office designated by the Secretary."
160. Section 107(b)(1) of the proposed Act provides that "at any time, upon request of
the Secretary, the claim holder shall demonstrate that the continued retention of a mining
claim located or converted under this Act is exclusively related to mineral activities at the
site." Section 107(b)(2) places the burden of proving the sufficiency of the claim on the claim
holder. Accordingly, section 107(b)(3) states that "[a]ny mining claim for which the claim
holder fails to demonstrate continued sufficiency, in the determination of the Secretary, pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, shall thereupon be deemed forfeited and be declared null
and void."
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the Act."'1 Additionally, pursuant to sections 105(a)(1) and (2), an

explorer must pay annual claim maintenance fees of $100 for converted claims, and of $200 for claims located pursuant to the Act.""
Section 306 of the proposed Act also requires that the claim holder
pay a royalty fee of eight percent of the "net smelter return" to the
United States as the Secretary prescribes. " Claims existing prior to
the effective date of this Act will be converted to be covered by the
proposed legislation (for all purposes except the right to patent)."6 '
The proposed Act imposes substantial obligations upon existing and
future claimants to minimize adverse environmental impact on the
land,' 6 5 and to reclaim mined land to a condition capable of support161.

Section 103(d)(3) also provides that such "location fee" must be paid to the Bu-

reau of Land Management at the time of the recording of the claim. Furthermore, the Secretary of Interior would be authorized to set and collect "user fees as may be necessary to
reimburse the United States for expenses incurred in administering" any and all requirements
of the Act. H.R. 322, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 402 (1993).
162. Section 105(b) requires that the payment of claim maintenance fees be payable on
or before August 31 of each year. Furthermore, section 105(e) allows for such fees to be
waived for the "claim holder who certifies in writing to the Secretary that on the date the
payment was due, the claim holder and all related parties held not more than 10 mining claims
on lands open to location."
Section 402 further states that "[t]he Secretary and the Secretary of Agriculture are each
authorized to establish and collect from persons ... [any] fees as may be necessary to reimburse the United States for the expense incurred in administering such requirements."
163. Section 306(a) states that "any mining claim located or converted under this Act..
.shall be subject to a royalty of 8 percent of the net smelter return from such pioduction." It
should be noted that section 105(h) allows for "[t]he amount of the annual claim maintenance
fee required to be paid under this section ...[to] be credited against the amount of royalty
required . ..under section 306 ....

164. Section 104(a) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on the effective date of this Act any
unpatented mining claim for a locatable mineral located under the General Mining
Laws prior to the date of enactment of this Act shall become subject to this Act's
provisions and shall be deemed a converted mining claim under this Act. Nothing in
this Act shall be construed to affect extralateral rights in any valid lode mining
claim existing on the date of enactment of this Act. After the effective date of this
Act, there shall be no distinction made as to whether such claim was originally
located as a lode or placer claim.
Sections 417(a) and (b) address the limitations placed on the issuance of patents for all
types of claims located or converted under this proposed Act.
165. Section 201 of the proposed Act deals with surface management standards. Section
201 states:
Notwithstanding the last sentence of section 302(b) of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, and in accordance with this title and other applicable
law, the Secretary, and for National Forest System lands the Secretary of Agriculture, shall require that mineral activities on Federal lands conducted by any person
minimize adverse impacts to the environment.
Section 202(a) requires that "[n]o person may engage in mineral activities on Federal
lands that may cause a disturbance of surface resources, including but not limited to, land, air,

HOFSTRA PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6:85

ing uses which such lands were capable of supporting before the surface disturbances occurred.' 66 The proposed Act also requires the
posting of financial guarantees for the estimated cost of reclamation
prior to commencement of mining activities 167 and sets forth detailed
reclamation standards.' a
V.

TAKING PROPERTY AS THE LIMITS OF REDEFINITION

Most Supreme Court cases that interpret the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment 9 fall within two classes.1 70 "Where the government authorizes a physical occupation of property (or actually
takes title), the Takings Clause generally requires compensation. 17 1
The government effects such a per se taking, for example, when it
floods a landowner's property,1 7 requires a landowner to suffer from
the physical occupation of his premises by the installation of cable
for television on his building, 73 or destroys the use of land as a
chicken farm by noise from low-flying military aircraft.1 7' However,
a law that results in a transfer of wealth from a landowner to others
or that deprives a landowner of some right of disposition (e.g., choos76
ing tenants) does not establish a per se taking.
[W]here the government merely regulates the use of property,
compensation is required only if considerations such as the purpose
of the regulation and the extent to which it deprives the owner of
the economic use of the property suggest that the regulation has
water (both ground and surface) fish, wildlife, and biota unless... (2) a permit was issued to
such person under this title authorizing such activities."
Section 203 deals with the obtaining of exploration permits.
166. Section 207 contains the provisions on reclamation. The general rule on reclamation as set forth in 207(a) states: "[except as provided under paragraphs (5) and (7) of subsection (b), the operator [of a claim] shall restore lands subject to mineral activities carried
out under a permit issued under this title to a condition" of natural topography and vegetation
as existed prior to the disturbance of the surface.
167. Section 206 requires a claimant to provide financial guarantees prior to the commencement of any mineral activity causing more than minimal disturbance to the environment, to ensure the complete and timely reclamation of the mining area.
168. The various reclamation standards for each type of mining activity are found in
section 207(b)(1) through (10). Additionally, section 207(b) allows for the Secretary to promulgate any necessary and further standards depending upon the type of mining performed.
169. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
170. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 1526 (1992).
171. Id.; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441
(1982). Both of these cases will be discussed infra.
172. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 180 (1871).
173. Loreto, 458 U.S. at 438.
174. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262, 267 (1946).
175. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1529.
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bear a burden that
unfairly singled out the property owner to
17 6
should be borne by the public as a whole.9
Unlike the per se takings cases, which require courts to apply a clear
rule, the regulatory takings cases "necessarily entail complex factual
assessments of the purposes and economic effects of government actions." 1 " A government action that denies a property owner "some
beneficial use of his property or that may restrict the owner's full
exploitation of the property" will be upheld "if such public action is
justified as promoting the general welfare." 178 The Court "has been
unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice
and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action
be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. "179 Instead, the Court
"'has examined the "taking" question by engaging in essentially ad
hoc, factual inquiries that have identified several factors-such as
the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action ..

' "180

It was not until 1922, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,"1
that the Supreme Court recognized that, if the protection against
physical appropriations of private property was to be meaningfully
enforced, the government's power to redefine the range of interests
included in the ownership of property was necessarily constrained by
constitutional limits.1 8 " Thus, a government regulation which limits a
landowner in the use of her property or requires her to perform particular acts in the use of her property will not be upheld where it
fails to "substantially advance a legitimate [government] interest,"
or has the effect of depriving the owner's property of an "economi176. Id. at 1526; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 12325 (1978).
177. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1526; see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). See generally
Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1988); John R. Nolon, Footprints in the Shifting Sands of the Isle of Palms: A PracticalAnalysis of Regulatory Takings
Cases, 8 J.LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (1992).
178. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 499 U.S. 155, 163 (1980); Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 125-29. The Court will uphold "laws or programs that adversely affect
recognized economic values." Id. at 124.
179. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124.
180. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 714 (1987) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)) (emphasis added).
181. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
182. Id. at 413-15.
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cally viable use." ' 3
A regulatory taking may also occur by the imposition of an exaction-a "forced contribution to general governmental revenues...
not reasonably related to the costs" of any governmental benefits or
services provided.'" Where there is such a nexus, an exaction is not

a taking, but instead is often characterized as a "user fee.'

85

The

Court in United States v. Sperry Corp. held that, to avoid a takings
finding, it is sufficient that the "user fee" be intended to reimburse
183. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); see Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 834 (1987); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclam. Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264
(1981).
184. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163 (1980). This
case considered the effect of "a Florida statute appropriating interest on funds deposited into a
court registry by an interpleader complaint." United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62
n.8 (1989). "Florida law provided for both the deduction of a small percentage of the interpleader funds as a fee for services rendered by the clerk of the court and the deduction of
interest earned on the funds." Id. at 62. The court struck down the law stating that "[i]t [was]
obvious that the interest was not a fee for services, for any services obligation to the county
was paid for and satisfied by the substantial fee charged ... and described specifically . . . as a
fee 'for services' by the clerk's office." Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at 162. The
Court "failed to discern any justification for the deduction of the interest other than the bare
transfer of private property to the county." Sperry, 493 U.S. at 62.
185. Sperry, 493 U.S. at 53, 63. In Sperry, the user fee was a charge for the use of an
established Tribunal for the recovery of claims against Iran. Id. The "user fee" was exacted
"as reimbursement to the United States government for expenses incurred in connection with
the arbitration of claims of United States claimants against Iran before the Tribunal and the
maintenance of the Security Account." Id. at 60. "Prior to the 1979 seizure of the United
States Embassy in Tehran, Sperry, an American parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, entered into contracts with the Government of Iran." Id. at 53. "After the Embassy
seizure, Sperry filed suit for claims against Iran in a [district] court and obtained a prejudgment attachment of Iranian assets." Id. "Subsequently, the United States and Iran entered
into the Algiers Accords, which established, inter alia, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
(the "Tribunal") to arbitrate Americans' claims against Iran, specified that Tribunal awards
are final, binding, and enforceable in the courts of any nation, and placed $1 billion of Iranian
assets in a Security Account for the payment of awards to the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York and thence to claimants." Id. "After Executive Orders implementing the Accords invalidated Sperry's attachment and prohibited it from further pursuing its claims in American
courts, Sperry filed a claim with the Tribunal and ultimately entered into a settlement agreement whereby Iran promised to pay it $2.8 million ....
Id. "Congress then enacted section
502 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, . . . which require[d] the Federal Reserve
Board to deduct a percentage of the [claimant's] award [and pay the United States Treasury]
"as reimbursement to the ... Government for expenses incurred in connection with the arbitration of claims ... before [the] Tribunal and the maintenance of the Security Account." Id.
"When the Federal Reserve Board so deducted a percentage of Sperry's award, Sperry renewed a suit it had previously filed in the Claims Court, arguing that the deduction authorized
by section 502 was unconstitutional." Id. "The [lower] court rejected the claim and dismissed
the suit, but the Court of Appeals reversed." Id. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals and remanded the case back to the Federal Circuit. See Sperry Corp. v. United
States, 925 F.2d 399 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 53 (1991).
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costs incurred by the government, and it is not necessary "that the

amount of [the] user fee be precisely calibrated to the use that a
party makes of government services," 1a but only that it is a "fair
approximation of the costs of benefits supplied.

' 87

The question of taking by financial exaction has also arisen in
the context of land use impact fees.188 An impact fee is lawful and
not a taking where the fee bears a rational relationship to a legitimate public purpose. 1s8 "For example, courts have sustained require-

ments that [land] developers construct various on-site improvements,
such as sewers, water mains, sidewalks, curbs and gutters, storm
drains, and landscaping." 110 "Requiring off-site improvements that
serve a public purpose, such as roads, schools, parks and sewage
treatment plants, may also be justified where the requirement allevi-

ates a public burden or ameliorates harmful effects caused by
development."

191

186. Sperry, 493 U.S. at 60.
187. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 463 n.19 (1978)). In
Massachusetts, the Court:

upheld a flat registration fee assessed by the Federal Government on civil aircraft,
including aircraft owned by the States, against a challenge that the fee violated the
principle of intergovernmental tax immunity. In holding that the.registration charge
could be upheld because it was a user fee rather than a tax, the Court rejected
Massachusetts' argument that the "amount of the tax is a flat annual fee and hence
is not directly related to the degree of use of the airways." The Court recognized
that when the Federal Government applies user charges to a large number of parties, it probably will charge a user more or less than it would under a perfect userfee system, but we declined to impose a requirement that the government "give
weight to every factor affecting appropriate compensation for airport and airway
use."

Id. at 60-61 (citations omitted). In Sperry, the court found that the fees were not "so clearly
excessive as to belie their purported character as user fees." Id. at 62.
188. See generally Gus Bauman & William H. Ethier, Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A Survey of American Practices, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 51 (1987); Brian W.
Blaesser & Christine M. Kentopp, Impact Fees: The Second Generation, 38 WASH. U. J. URB.
& CONTEMP. L. 55 (1990).
189. Commercial Builders v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 1991).
190. Id. at 876-77.
191. Id. at 877. In Commercial Builders, the court addressed the constitutionality of a
city ordinance which:
imposes a fee in connection with the issuance of permits for non-residential development of the type that will generate jobs. The fees were to be paid into a fund to
assist in the financing of low-income housing. In challenging the ordinance, Commercial Builders conceded that the city had [a legitimate interest in expanding lowincome housing, but argued that the ordinance constituted] an impermissible means
to advance that interest because it places the burden of paying for low-income housing on non-residential development without a sufficient showing that non-residential
development contributed to the need for low-income housing in proportion to that
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Evolving Public Values in the Ad Hoc Analysis

The development of an ad hoc analysis for regulatory takings
cases indicates a change in public values that many argue have and
should advise takings jurisprudence. 19 Of particular importance is
the idea that "land and natural resources are our common heritage,
to which we all have equal claims,"' s and which are "not properly

subject to claims of ownership in perpetuity, but must be managed in
such a way that all people in all generations share their benefits.""
The idea of evolving public values may be the only way to explain and reconcile recent takings cases with longstanding principles.
burden. [The Court of Appeals affirmed a District Court in upholding the ordinance
based on the fact that the ordinance] was enacted after a careful study revealed the
amount of low-income housing that would likely become necessary as a direct result
of the influx of workers that would be associated with the new non-residential
development.
Id. at 873-74. The court found that the assessment was not excessive but bore a "rational
relationship to a public cost closely associated with such development." Id. at 874; see also
Leroy Land Dev. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 939 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1991).
192. See T. Nicolaus Tideman, Takings, Moral Evolution, and Justice, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1714, 1723 (1988).
193. Id. at 1723.
194. Id. Tideman quotes a famous passage by John Locke that addresses whether "anyone [can] properly use land if no one can properly claim to own land":
The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his.
Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it
in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned [sic] to it something that is his own,
and thereby makes it his Property.It being by him removed from the common state
Nature placed it in, hath by this Labour something annexed to it, that excludes the
common right of other Men. For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of
the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joyned [sic] to,
at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.
Id. at 1723-24 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, SECOND TREATISE
§ 27 (1960)).
Tideman argues that "the finiteness of land makes all claims to perpetual possession inconsistent with Locke's proviso." Id. at 1724. He states:
Natural resources share with land the quality of being provided by nature, but
differ from land in that they are exhaustible. Therefore the application of Lockean
principles to natural resources requires separate treatment.
. . .Any person's claim upon exhaustible natural resources is consistent with
Locke's proviso if the value of the claim does not exceed a person's dividend under
such a rule. Locke's proviso thus constrains the claims that people can make upon
land and natural resources, but it does not impose impossible constraints.
Id.; see also John A. Humbach, Law and a New Land Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REV. 339 (1989);
John A. Humbach, Economic Due Process and the Takings Clause, 4 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
311 (1987); E. George Rudolph, Let's Hear it for Due Process-An Up to Date Primer on
Regulatory Takings, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 355 (1987); Joseph L. Sax, Why We Will
Not (Should Not) Sell the Public Lands: Changing Conception of Private Property, 1983
UTAH L. REV. 313.
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In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,19 5 the Supreme Court declared
invalid, as applied to the facts of the case, a Pennsylvania statute
that required that a certain amount of coal be left in place during
the underground mining of coal to protect the surface from subsidence. 9 ' At the time, "the coal companies had owned vast areas of
land ...[and] had sold much of th[e] land, reserving not only [the
rights to] the coal, but 'the right to . . . remove the [coal]'" with
immunity from any liability for any damage occasioned by its removal. 197 In other words, the coal companies reserved a specific
property interest: the right of subjacent support, or the right to withhold from sale.' 98 After passage of the Kohler Act in 1921,1'9 a
homeowner successfully sued to enjoin the mining of coal that
threatened to cause subsidence resulting in the collapse of his private
residence. 0 0 The Pennsylvania court found that the Kohler Act, created to prohibit mining that would cause any subsidence under land
improved by buildings or roads, was a proper exercise of the police
power in light of the legislative finding that the enjoined activity
threatened the health and safety of a large number of people."' The
lower court ruled that the exercise of the police power precluded any
claim that the Act effected an unconstitutional taking. 02 The clear

effect of this ruling was that the coal companies could not continue
mining under or adjacent to land where the surface rights were not
195. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). For an interesting and thoughtful discussion of the history,
politics, and philosophy of this case, see E. F. Roberts, Mining with Mr. Justice Holmes, 39
VAND. L. REV. 287 (1986).
196. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 393.
197. Roberts, supra note 195, at 288; see also Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 395.
198. Hugh G. Montgomery, The Development of the Right of Subjacent Support and
the "'ThirdEstate" in Pennsylvania, 25 TEMP. L. Q. 1 (1951); see Noone v. Price, 298 S.E.2d
218 (W. Va. 1982); McCabe v. City of Parkersburg, 79 S.E.2d 87 (W. Va. 1953). See generally RICHARD POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, ch. 63 (Patrick J. Rohan ed., rev. ed.
1986).
199. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 661-71 (1966). The Kohler Act was a legislative response to the ruling in Commonwealth ex rel. Keator v. Clearview Coal Co., 100 A. 820 (Pa.
1917), that a coal company can continue mining under a schoolhouse, regardless of the danger
that it may collapse, because the coal company owned both the mineral estate and the right of
support, and the exploitation of both of these property interests did not amount to a public
nuisance. Id. at 820-21.
200. Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 118 A. 491 (Pa. 1922), rev'd, 260 U.S. 393
(1922).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 493-94. In Roberts' view, the perceived difference in result between Mahon
and Keator was that in Mahon there had been a legislative finding of public nuisance. See
Roberts, supra note 195, at 289.
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also owned by the coal companies. 0°
The Supreme Court reversed, stating that the Act "purport[ed]
to abolish what [was] recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate in
land," the right of support, which the coal companies withheld in the
° By abolishing this property interest, the
sale of the surface estate. M
Act transferred a benefit to the community, but at no cost to the
community.20 5 The Court reasoned that if this could be done, the
public in similar situations would always resort to police power to
take away an individual's property in lieu of the eminent domain
power, and consequently, the institution of private property itself
would be in jeopardy. 0
Sixty-five years later, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis,2 0 7 the Court ruled on essentially the same question. A
Pennsylvania statute required that substantial amounts of coal be
left in place when mining under public buildings, non-commercial
buildings used by the public such as churches and dwellings, streams
and reservoirs.2 08 The Act's preamble sets out the public purposes to
be served, including "the conservation of surface land areas which
may be affected in the mining of bituminous coal . . . , to enhance
the value of such lands for taxation, to aid in the preservation of
surface water drainage and public water supplies, and generally to
improve the use and enjoyment of such lands. '' 0
Keystone argued that the Act was invalid "on its face" because
it violated both the Takings Clause and the Contracts Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.2 10 Keystone relied on Pennsylvania Coal Co., arguing that it was indistinguishable. 1 1 The District Court, the Court
of Appeals, and the Supreme Court all held that Pennsylvania Coal
Co. was indeed distinguishableand upheld the validity of the Act. 2
203. Consider Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (law effectively
preventing continued operation of a quarry in a residential area was not a taking); Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (law barring operation of a brick mill in a residential area
was not a taking); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (declaration that a
livery stable constituted a public nuisance rather than a taking); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887) (statute which prohibited operation of brewery was not a taking).
204. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 414.
205. Id. at 415-16.
206. Id. at 413.
207. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
208. Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, 52 PA. Co Ns. STAT.
ANN. §§ 1406.1-1406.21 (Supp. 1994).
209. Id. § 1406.2.
210. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 474.
211. Id. at 474, 481-84.
212. Id. at 474.
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The distinction rested on several grounds. 1 First, the "public
interest" in Pennsylvania Coal Co. that would justify the abolition of
a particular estate in land was not shown; instead the case centered
on a threat to a private house. 1 ' Any other discussion of the validity
of the Kohler Act was advisory only.2 15 Second, the "public purpose"
of the statute in Keystone, in contrast to the Kohler Act in Pennsylvania Coal Co., was clearly established 21 bringing Keystone within
the line of cases including Mugler v. Kansas2 17 Hadacheck v. Sebastian,211 and Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 1 9 which, according
to Justice Stevens, were not overruled by Pennsylvania Coal Co.2 '
Third, in Pennsylvania Coal Co., the finding was that the Kohler
Act made mining of certain coal "commercially impractical," 2 2 '
whereas in Keystone, the "petitioners [had] not shown any deprivation significant enough to satisfy the heavy burden placed upon one
alleging a regulatory taking. 2 2 2 Since the "record indicate[d] that
only about seventy-five percent of [Keystone's] underground coal
[could] be profitably mined," petitioners failed to show that their
"reasonable 'investment-backed expectations' ha[d] been materially
affected by" the requirement of leaving in place a small percentage
"to support the structures protected by" the statute.22 3 Last, the
Court explained, the "support estate" allegedly taken from the petitioners should not be viewed "as a distinct segment of property for
'takings' purposes," and, even if so viewed, the record contained no
evidence of "what percentage of the purchased support estates...
ha[d] been affected by the Act."2 2' Accordingly, the Act met both
the legitimate end and reasonable means test standards for takings
213. Id.
214. Id. at 487-88.
215. Id. at 484.
216. Id. at 485-88.
217. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
218. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
219. 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
220. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 490.
221. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414-15.
222. Keystone. 480 U.S. at 493.
223. Id. at 499.
224. Id. at 501. Justice Stevens went on to reject the Contracts Clause argument, stating that the Court had consistently refused to construe it literally when the challenged legislation is "addressed to the legitimate end of protecting a basic interest of society" and "the
legislature's adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties [is based] upon
reasonable conditions and [is] of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying [the
legislation's] adoption." Id. at 503-05.
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As Justice Scalia pointed out in the most recent regulatory takings case, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,22 6 the holdings
in Keystone and Pennsylvania Coal Co., are virtually identical on
the facts, and therefore are apparently irreconcilable. 22 In Lucas,
Justice Scalia stated:
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our "deprivation of all economically feasible use" rule is greater than its precision, since the rule
does not make clear the "property interest" against which the loss
of value is to be measured . . . . Unsurprisingly, this uncertainty
regarding the composition of the denominator in our "deprivation"
fraction has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court.
Compare Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon . . . (law restricting

subsurface extraction of coal held to effect a taking) with Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis . . . (nearly identical law

held not to effect a taking); . . . The answer to this difficult question may lie in how the owner's reasonable expectations have been
shaped by the State's law of property-i.e., whether and to what
degree the State's law has accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular interest in land with respect to which the tak228
ings claimant alleges a diminution in (or elimination of) value.
If the last sentence of the quoted section is to be taken literally,
then, it is quite evident that the result in these later cases results
from the evolving standard, or at least a changing notion about the
meaning of property (from the liberal conception to one requiring
accommodation), and not from lawyering or the artful framing of
the issues.2 29
225. Id. at 506.
226. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
227. Id. at 2894 n.7.
228. Id. (citations omitted).
229. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The
idea of changing public values seemed particularly important in Penn Central. Id. There, the
Court considered whether the city's landmark preservation ordinance as applied to Grand Central Terminal effected a taking. Id. at 107. Under the ordinance, any plan to alter the exterior
of a building designated as an historic landmark had to be approved by the Landmarks Preservation Commission. Id. at 112. Penn Central sought to alter the exterior of the terminal by
constructing a skyscraper over it, which would increase the income from the site, but would
also substantially change the character of the terminal building. Id. at 116. The Commission
denied a permit for the plans. Id. at 117. Penn Central sued in state court, alleging that the
application of the ordinance effected an impermissible taking without compensation. Id. at
119. The trial court granted injunctive relief, but no damages. Id. The appellate court reversed, and then the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate court, having found
that no taking had occurred because a mere reduction in value, unaccompanied by a transfer
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"DERANGEMENT

TO THE EXPECTATION"

By

REDEFINITION

Context, Relativity, Accommodation, and the Community

In the context of a discussion of radical developments in water
law in California,23 ° one scholar, Professor Eric T. Freyfogle, offered
"the best glimpse of the future of property law," a chapter in a

"story of context and relativity, of accommodation and commu-

nity."2 31 Freyfogle studied the recent California case of In re Water
of Hallett Creek Stream System, a2 and the central concerns raised
to the government, is not a taking. Id. at 119-21.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in a six to three
decision. Id. at 106. Justice Brennan's majority opinion included an admission that the Court
has been "unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government,
rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons." Id. at 124. Justice
Brennan goes on to review the Court's takings cases and to identify "several factors that have
particular significance" in such cases: (1)"[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations;" (2) "the character of the government action," noting that "[a]
'taking' may more readily be found when the interference ... can be characterized as a physical invasion by government"; and (3) whether they are "government actions that may be characterized as acquisitions of resources to permit or facilitate uniquely public functions." Id. at
124-28.
Justice Brennan rejected the takings claim because "the law [did] not interfere with what
must be regarded as Penn Central's primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel," and
Penn Central was able "to obtain a 'reasonable return' on its investment" in the terminal site.
Id. at 136. Moreover, the record did not show that Penn Central would be unable to use some
of the air space above the terminal, "since [it had] not sought approval for the construction of
a smaller structure" than the one first proposed and its air rights were made "transferable to
at least eight parcels in the vicinity of the Terminal, one or two of which have been found
suitable for the construction of new office buildings." Id. at 137. The ability to transfer its air
space development rights would "undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens" the law
ha[d] imposed on [Penn Central]," even if it did not constitute "just compensation." Id. The
Court explicitly rejected the view that the police power can only be exercised in order to prevent "harm" to the public health, safety, or general welfare. Id. at 125. Instead, it is a proper
exercise of this power where the governmental purpose is "substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare." Id. at 138.
230. In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream Sys., 749 P.2d 324 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied
sub noma.California v. United States, 488 U.S. 824 (1988). The California Supreme Court
ruled that the federal government, as owner of nearly half the land in the state, held riparian
water rights on the lands it set aside for particular federal purposes, but that the extent of
rights were determined with reference to the interests of other water users. Id. at 327.
231. Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law, 41
STAN. L. REV. 1529, 1530 (1989). Freyfogle points out that the "law of surface water, at least
[today] in California, bears little resemblance to our traditional conception of property"; that
"[a]utonomous, secure property rights have largely given way to use entitlements that are
interconnected and relative." Id. He predicted that "[p]rivate property in the coming decades,
. . .might well exist principally in the form of specific use-rights. . . . [where] rights [are]
defined in specific contexts and in terms of similar rights held by other people." Id. at 1530-31.
232. 749 P.2d 324.
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by the case as to "how far a state can go in redefining the attributes
of private property ownership," without incurring the obligation to
make just compensation."' Freyfogle "asks us to consider the difference[s] between regulating the use of a piece of property and redefining what it means to own that property in the first place."23 4 The
author points out that Hallett Creek and its predecessors "reflect the
court's power to control water use by changing the underlying defini23 5
tion of water rights rather than by regulating their exercise. 1
Freyfogle interprets the new California water rights model "as concomitant to the rise of the community and the decline of the individual in American law and political culture, . . . [which view] replaces
the classical liberal focus on individual autonomy and economic freedom."" Thus, "[b]y recovering for the public the right to prohibit
particular practices and to decide when and where new uses will occur, California ha[d] disaggregated the owner's bundle and recovered many of the entitlement sticks for public holding."23 7 Thus, after Hallett Creek, "water rights in California are no longer
autonomous;" but are constrained by "the reasonableness limit, public trust doctrine, and the no-harm rule. '2 38 Water rights require
"sharing and accommodation" and contain a "temporal dynamism"
(i.e., one that may be limited as circumstances change).2 3 9 Freyfogle
applauds this approach, and supports William Kittredge's argument
for a "new myth of property ownership" with an emphasis on context and accommodation; one that recognizes that "we never owned
all the land and water . . . [and that] [o]ur rights to property will
never take precedence over the needs of society. 2 40
As Freyfogle notes, Hallett Creek illustrates a growing departure from the liberal conception of property, 24 1 a shift by redefinition
of the essence of the property interest; a shift that is achieved in a
fashion that is less specific, but more encompassing than particular
regulations which prohibit particular conduct. A redefinition presents
Freyfogle, supra note 231 at 1531.
Id. at 1531 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1538. "[T]he road to Hallett Creek represents California's evolving assertion
over the process of defining water rights." Id. at 1546.
Id. at 1545.
Id. at 1546.
Id. at 1541.
Id. at 1541-42.
240. Id. at 1555-56 (citing WILLIAM KITTREDGE, OWNING IT ALL 62, 64 (1987)).
241. Id. at 1545; see also Sax, supra note 194 (arguing that changing public values have
increased doubt about the extent to which rights of development should pass into private
hands).
233.
234.
235.
of control
236.
237.
238.
239.
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a new theory allowing new variables and new limits. The extent to
which a property interest may be redefined without constitutional
implications depends upon many factors, but of particular note is the
nature of the property interest involved. In the case of United States
v. Locke, 42 the Court explored the degree of permissible disturbance
to rights in mining claims by redefinition as it considered the validity
of the annual filing obligation under the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 ("FLPMA"). 43 In Locke, "[a]ppellees,

four individuals engaged 'in the business of operating mining properties in Nevada,' purchased in 1960 and 1966 ten unpatented mining
claims on public lands near Ely, Nevada." '4 4 "These claims were
major sources of gravel and building [material which were] valued
at several million dollars, and, in the 1979-1980 assessment year

alone, appellees' gross income totaled more than $1 million. '4 5 During the period in which they owned the claims, "appellees complied
242. 471 U.S. 84 (1985).
243. Id. at 86, 88-89 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1976)). The Act requires recording of
mining claims, and renders void those that are unrecorded. Id. at 89. Prior to the passage of
this Act, in the absence of a federal recording system and because of the existence of many
dormant mining claims,
federal land managers had to proceed slowly and cautiously in taking any action
affecting federal land lest the federal property rights of claimants be unlawfully
disturbed. Each time the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") proposed a sale or
other conveyance of federal land, a title search in the county recorder's office was
necessary; if an outstanding mining claim was found, no matter how stale or apparently abandoned, formal administrative adjudication was required to determine the
validity of the claim.
After more than a decade of studying this problem in the context of a broader
inquiry into the proper management of the public lands in the modern era, Congress, in 1976, enacted the FLPMA ....
Id. at 87. Under the Act, as it was at the time of the Locke dispute, the Department of the
Interior's Bureau of Land Management is responsible for managing the mineral resources on
federal forest lands. See 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976). "Section 314, [of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1744] establishes a federal recording system that is designed both to rid federal lands of
stale mining claims and to provide federal land managers with up-to-date information that
allows them to make informed land management decisions. Locke, 471 U.S. at 87.
"For claims located before FLPMA's enactment, the federal recording system impose[d]
two general requirements." Id. at 87-88. "First, the claims must initially be registered with the
BLM by filing, within three years of FLPMA's enactment, a copy of the official record of the
notice or certificate of location." Id. Second, in the year of the initial recording, and "prior to
December 31" of every year after that, the claimant must file with state officials and with
BLM a notice of intention to hold the claim, an affidavit of assessment work performed on the
claim, or a detailed reporting form. Id. at 89. Section 1744(c) "provides that failure to comply
with either of these requirements 'shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment
of the mining claim . . . by the owner.'" Id. at 89 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1976)).
244. Locke, 471 U.S. at 89.
245. Id.

HOFSTRA PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6:85

with annual state-law filing and assessment work requirements." ' 246
Additionally, "appellees satisfied FLPMA's initial recording requirement by properly filing with BLM a notice of location, thereby putting their claims on record for purposes of FLPMA. ' 24
At the end of 1980, however, the appellees failed to timely meet
their first annual obligation to file their report with the appropriate
federal authority. 8 Allegedly receiving misleading information from
a BLM employee, appellees delayed until December 31 to file the
annual notice of intent to hold, or proof of assessment work per249 This filing was one day late.2 50
formed, as required by the Act.
Thereafter, the appellees were informed that their claims had been
declared abandoned and void because of their late filing.25 1 After losing an administrative appeal, appellees sought relief in the Supreme
Court, arguing that section 314 of the FLPMA 252 "effected an unwithout just compensation and
constitutional taking of their property
253
law."
of
process
due
them
denied
I Appellees' claims were rejected. The Court held that a statutory
provision which terminates property rights upon an owner's failure to
take the affirmative actions required by the statute does not take
property. 5 4 Even as to vested property rights, a legislature generally
has the power to impose new regulatory constraints on the way in
which those rights are used, or to condition their continued retention
on performance of certain affirmative duties.2 55 "As long as the constraint or duty imposed is a reasonable restriction designed to further
legitimate legislative objectives, the legislature acts within its powers
in imposing such new constraints or duties."2'56 In the Court's view,
Congress' power to qualify existing property rights is particularly
broad where the "character" of the property rights at issue-mining
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 89-90.
250. Id. at 90.
251. Id.
252. 43 U.S.C. § 1744(c) (1976).
253. Locke, 471 U.S. at 91-92. After their administrative appeal, the appellees first
sought relief in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. Id. at 91. Appellees claim was rejected in the District Court, whereupon they petitioned the Supreme Court.

Id.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 104 (citing Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 525 (1982)).
Id.
Id.
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claims-is a "unique form of property. 2 57 Claimants take their mineral interests with the knowledge that the government retains a substantial power to qualify and redefine such interests. The legislative
history supported the conclusion that the statute would extinguish
those claims for which timely filings were not made, regardless of
any evidence of intent to abandon. 58 "[T]he failure to file on time,
25 91
in and of itself, causes a claim to be lost."
The Court went on to hold that filing one day late did not
amount to substantial compliance with the Act. The Court stated:
The notion that a filing deadline can be complied with by filing
sometime after the deadline falls due is, to say the least, a surprising notion, and it is a notion without limiting principle. If 1-day
late filings are acceptable, 10-day late filings might be equally acceptable, and so on in a cascade of exceptions that would engulf
the rule erected by the filing deadline; yet regardless of where the
cutoff line is set, some individuals will always fall just on the other
side of it ....A filing deadline cannot be complied with, substan260
tially or otherwise, by filing late-even by one day.

Locke is important because the Court affirmed the power of the
legislatures, state and federal, to go beyond mere regulation and to
make definitional changes in property interests. In Locke, the government redefined the mining claim from one which could be lost
only by the failure to produce minerals, to one which could be lost
by the failure to perform additional administrative acts. 61 Several
257. Id.
258. See id. at 94-96.
259. Id. at 100; see also Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 628 (9th Cir.
1981).
260. Id. at 100-01.
261. The Locke Court explained that the purposes of applying FLPMA's filing provisions to claims located before the Act was passed-"to rid federal lands of stale mining claims
and to provide for centralized collection by federal land managers of comprehensive and up-todate information on the status of recorded but unpatented mining claims-are clearly legitimate." Id. at 105-06. Additionally, the statute
is a reasonable, if severe, means of furthering these goals; sanctioning with loss of
their claims those claimants who fail to file provides a powerful motivation to comply with the filing requirement, while automatic invalidation for noncompliance enables federal land managers to know with certainty and ease whether a claim is
currently valid.
Id. at 106. "[Tlhe restriction attached to the continued retention of a mining claim imposes
the most minimal of burdens on claimants; they must simply file a paper once a year indicating that the required assessment work has been performed or that they intend to hold the
claim." Id. Accordingly, the possibility of the extinguishment of a vested property interest
based upon rules not pertaining at the creation of the right established no constitutional
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years earlier, in Texaco, Inc. v. Short,26 2 the Court considered the
constitutionality of a similar state statute. There, the Indiana mineral lapse statute provided that a severed mineral interest not used
for a period of twenty years would automatically lapse and revert to
the current surface owner of the property."' The lapse did not apply
if the mineral owner had used the mineral interest or filed a statement of claim in the local recorder's office. 6" Several forms of "use"
of a mineral interest that were sufficient to preclude extinction of a
claim "include[d] the actual or attempted production of minerals,
the payment of rents or royalties, and any payment of taxes. 12 6 5 Parties whose interests were extinguished under the statute maintained,
among other things, that the statute effected a taking of private
property for public use without just compensation. 60 In rejecting the
takings argument, the Court first noted the nature of the property
interest in a severed mineral interest. The state had defined this estate as a "'vested property interest,' entitled to 'the same protection
as . . fee simple titles.' "267 However, the Court explained, the state
had declared that this property interest was one of less than absolute
duration, unlike fee simple titles, with retention being conditioned on
the fulfillment of at least one of the requirements of the Act. 6 But
this redefinition was not a taking. Rather, the Court explained,
"[w]e have no doubt that, just as a State may create a property
interest that is entitled to constitutional protection, the State has the
power to condition the permanent retention of that property right on
the performance of reasonable conditions that indicate a present intention to retain the interest. 2 6 9
The Court went on to find that the state had not exercised its
legislative power in an arbitrary manner.2 7 0 Rather, the statute described specific actions which, if undertaken by an owner of a sevclaims. Id. at 107.
262. 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
263. Id. at 518.
264. Id. at 518-19.
265. Id. at 519.
266. Id. at 522. These parties also argued that the self-executing aspect of the statute,
i.e., that extinguishment would occur without prior notice of the imminence of the extinguishment, violated their procedural due process rights. Id.
267. Id. at 525-26 (citation omitted).
268. Id. at 526.
269. Id. The Court stated that "[flrom an early time, this Court has recognized that
States have the power to permit unused or abandoned interests in property to revert to another
after the passage of time." Id.
270. Id. at 529.
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ered mineral estate, would avoid lapse.271 The specific actions added
further legitimacy to the state's goals of encouraging owners of mineral interests to develop the potential of those interests; promoting
the state's fiscal interest in collecting property taxes; and "facilitating the identification and location of mineral owners, from whom developers may acquire operating rights and from whom the county
could collect taxes." 2 ' The Court concluded that "[t]he State surely
has the power to condition the ownership of property on compliance
with conditions that impose such a slight burden
on the owner while
2 73
providing such clear benefits to the State.
Locke and Texaco affirmed the power of legislatures, both state
and federal, to go beyond mere regulation and to make definitional
changes in property interests, depending upon the nature of the property interest. This seems to be what Freyfogle argues should be done
in the case of natural resources.2 In Freyfogle's view, the power of
the legislature to reshape water law is derived from a consideration
of the special and essential nature of water. 75 In Locke, Congress'
power to redefine mining claims exists because of the unique nature
of a mining claim, although the Supreme Court has never clearly
explained in what way it is unique. 7 6 Perhaps, as in Hallett Creek,
it is unique because it involves private claims on exhaustible natural
and public resources.2 7 In Texaco, some form of reshaping or qualification that exposes a property owner to the possible loss of a vested
property right in ways different from the common law is within the
power of the government if the conditions imposed for continued
ownership are reasonable - i.e., either because costs are not excessive or because the statute allows a reasonable opportunity to perform the conditions in order to avoid loss of the property. 7 8
While these cases do not inform as to all possible derangement
to the expectation that is permitted by law, the Court did venture to
draw a line in a different context in a case involving a statute which
271. See id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 529-30. The claimants' due process arguments were rejected under the logic
of the Takings Clause. See id. at 531-38.
274. See Freyfogle, supra note 231, at 1531.
275. Id. at 1530-31.
276. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 104 (1985) (citation omitted).
277. In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream Sys., 749 P.2d 324 (Cal. 1988) (involving
petition for statutory adjudication of water rights), cert. denied sub. nom. California v. United
States, 488 U.S. 824 (1988).
278. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 526 (1982).
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ostensibly redefined a property interest, but which had the effect of
denying altogether a fundamental right otherwise inherent in that
property interest. 7 9 In Hodel v. Irving,180 at issue was the Indian

Land Consolidation Act2 81 which provided for the escheat of small
undivided property interests that were unproductive during the year
preceding the owner's death. 82 The Indian Land Consolidation Act
was enacted to ameliorate the problem of fractionated ownership of
279. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
280. Id.
281. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2201-10 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993). The Court in Hodel described the
purpose of the Act as follows:
Towards the end of the 19th century, Congress enacted a series of land Acts which
divided the communal reservations of Indian tribes into individual allotments for
Indians and unallotted lands for non-Indian settlement. This legislation seems to
have been in part animated by a desire to force Indians to abandon their nomadic
ways in order to "speed the Indians's assimilation into American society" and in
part a result of pressure to free new lands for further white settlement.
Hodel, 481 U.S. at 706 (citation omitted).
282. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 709. As a background to the issues here, Congress adopted
legislation in 1889 which authorized the
[d]ivision of the Great Reservation of the Sioux Nation into separate reservations
and the allotment of specific tracts of reservation land to individual Indians, conditional on the consent of three-fourths of the adult male Sioux [under the Act of
Mar. 2, 1889, Ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888]. Under [this legislation], each male Sioux
head of household took 320 acres of land and most other individuals 160 acres. In
order to protect the allottees from the improvident disposition of their lands to white
settlers, the Sioux allotment statute provided that the allotted lands were to be held
in trust by the United States. Until 1910, the lands of deceased allottees passed to
their heirs "according to the laws of the State or Territory" where the land was
located . . . and after 1910, allottees were permitted to dispose of their interests by
will in accordance with regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior [in
order to protect Indian ownership].
Id. 706-07 (citations omitted).
As Justice O'Connor stated in her opinion:
The policy of allotment of Indian lands quickly proved disastrous for the Indians.
Cash generated by land sales to whites was quickly dissipated, and the Indians,
rather than farming the lands themselves, evolved into petty landlords, leasing their
allotted lands to white ranchers and farmers and living off the meager rentals. The
failure of the allotment program became even clearer as successive generations
came to hold the allotted lands. Thus, 40-, 80-, and 160-acre parcels became splintered into multiple undivided interests in land, with some parcels having hundreds,
and many parcels having dozens, of owners. Because the land was held in trust and
often could not be alienated or partitioned, the fractionation problem grew and grew
over time.
Id. at 707 (citation omitted).
The administrative burdens in keeping track of ownership interests became all consuming.
In response, Congress ended further allotment of Indian Lands by an act in 1934. However,
"the end of future allotment by itself could not prevent the further compounding of the existing problem caused by the passage of time[,] . . . [as] [o]wnership continued to fragment
[with the] succeeding generations [which] came to hold property." Id. at 708.
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Indian Lands. 8 3 Section 207 of that Act provided:
No undivided fractional interest in any tract of trust or restricted
land within a tribe's reservation or otherwise subjected to a tribe's
jurisdiction shall descent [sic] by intestacy or devise but shall escheat to that tribe if such interest represents 2 per centum or less
of the total acreage in such tract and has earned to its owner less
than $100 in the preceding year before it is due to escheat.2 8
Congress made no provision for the payment of compensation to the
owners of the interests covered by this section.28 3
Appellees were members of the Sioux Tribe who were representatives, heirs or devisees of interests covered by section 207.2 86
They maintained that section 207 resulted in a taking of property
without just compensation.2 87 The District Court held that the "statute was constitutional . . . [and that] the appellees had no vested
interest in the property of the decedents prior to their deaths, and
that Congress had plenary authority to abolish the power of testamentary disposition of Indian property and to alter the rules of intestate succession. 28 8
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. [While] it
agreed that the appellees had no vested rights in the decedents'
property, it concluded that their decedents had a right, derived
from the original Sioux allotment statute, to control disposition of
their property at death. The court held that the appellees had
standing to invoke that right and that the taking of that right by
[section 207]89 without compensation . . . violated the Fifth
Amendment .2
In affirming this decision, the Court first concluded that Congress' "broad authority to regulate the descent and devise of Indian
trust lands" 290 is justified in order to address the problem of the fractionation of Indian lands.2 9 1 The Court also recognized that, in general, "the Government has considerable latitude in regulating prop283. Indian Land Consolidation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-459, § 207, 96 Stat. 2517, 2519
(1983) (amended 1990).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 709.
287. Id. at 710.
288. Id.
289. Id. (citation omitted).
290. Id. at 712.
291. Id.
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erty rights in ways that may adversely affect the owners. '"292 The
Court further noted that "[tihe framework for [determining]
whether a regulation of property amounts to a taking requiring just
compensation [was] firmly established and [had] been regularly and
recently reaffirmed. ' 293 However, this framework required, among
other things, a consideration of "the economic impact of the regulation."2 9' In this case, "[tihere [was] no question that the relative
economic impact of section 207 upon the owners of these property
rights [had the potential to] be substantial. 2 95 Although the section
provided for the escheat of small unproductive property interests, the
economic impact was not lessened because of the nominal income of
the property. 90 When the total value of the property was consolidated its value was much greater, and there was "no question . . .
that the right to pass on valuable property to one's heirs is itself a
valuable right. '2 97 Indeed, "[d]epending on the age of the owner,
much or most of the value of the parcel may inhere in this 'remainder' interest. 298
The Court found, however, that the extent to which any of the
appellees' decedents had "investment-backed expectations" in passing on the property was dubious.29 9 None of the appellees could identify any specific expectations "beyond the fact that their ancestors
agreed to accept allotment only after ceding to the United States
large parts of the original Great Sioux Reservation." 3 00 In fact, the
property had been held in trust for the Indians for 100 years and
was overwhelmingly acquired by gift, descent, or devise.30 1 "Because
of the highly fractionated ownership, the property [was] generally
held for lease rather than improved and used by the owners. "302 Also
weighing in favor of the validity of the statute, though weakly, was
the fact that consolidation of land might benefit the Tribe, since
owners of escheatable interests often benefit from the escheat of the
others' fractional interests and, consolidated lands were more pro292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id. at 713.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 714 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)).
Id.
See id.
Id. at 715.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ductive than fractionated lands.3 03
The Hodel Court continued by noting that if it were to end the
analysis at this point, it might well find that section 207 was constitutional.304 However, it was necessary to consider the "extraordinary" character of the government regulation. 0 5 The regulation
amounted to a "virtual[] abrogation of the right to pass on a certain
type of property -

the small undivided interest -

to one's heirs."306

As Justice O'Connor continued,
In one form or another, the right to pass on property-to one's
family in particular-has been part of the Anglo-American legal
system since feudal times. The fact that it might [have been] possible for the owners of these interests to effectively control disposition upon death through complex inter vivos transactions such as
revocable trusts [was] simply not an adequate substitute for the
rights taken, given the nature of the property. .

.

. Moreover, this

statute effectively abolishe[d] both descent and devise of these
property interests even when the passing of the property to the heir
might result in consolidation of property-as for instance when 07
the
heir already owned another undivided interest in the property.
Further, these rights of alienation were "abolished even in circumstances when the governmental purpose sought to be advanced, consolidation of ownership of Indian lands, did not conflict with the further descent of the property." 0 8
Given the seriousness of the problem of the fractional interests
in the Indian lands, it would be unquestionably within Congress'
power to enact corrective statutory provisions, such as by redefining
this property interest by making it non-divisible on pain of escheat or
non-descendibility thereby forcing the owners to formally designate
an heir to prevent escheat to the Tribe.30 9 However, Congress could
not redefine the interest with the result of the total elimination of
one of the six traditional rights inhering in property-the right to
alienate through devise or descent.3 "0
303.
304.

Id.
Id. at 716.

305.

Id.

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at .718.
Id.
See id.; see also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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Redefinition of Mining Rights in Earlier Legislation

Consistent with Locke and Texaco, and in spite of Hodel,
throughout the last century, Congress and governmental agencies
have adopted laws and policies pertaining to mining activities on
public land that have reshaped, redefined and curtailed the six rights
traditionally inhering in property."' 1 The right to use property has

been qualified by the Mining and Mineral Policy Act,"12 under
which the Bureau of Land Management has promulgated regulations "to encourage the development of federal mineral resources
and [the] reclamation of disturbed lands, . . . [and] to assure that
operations include adequate and responsible measures to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the Federal lands and to provide
for reasonable reclamation. "313

The National Forest Management Act 314 ("NFMA") gives the
Forest Service the responsibility of managing surface impacts from
mining on federal forest lands and requires detailed land use management plans before mining activities can continue. The Act specifies the contents of land use management plans and requires exten-

sive public participation

in connection with the formulation,

amendment, or revision of any plans.3 1 5 The right of excluding others
311. See supra part VI.A.
312. 30 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1988).
313. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.0-6 (1992). The objectives of the regulations are to:
(a) Provide for mineral entry, exploration, location, operations and purchase pursuant to the mining laws in a manner that will not unduly hinder such activities but
will assure that these activities are conducted in a manner that will prevent unnecessary or undue degradation and provide protection of non mineral resources of the
Federal lands;
(b) Provide for reclamation of disturbed areas; and
(c) Coordinate, to the greatest extent possible with appropriate state agencies, procedures for prevention of unnecessary or undue degradation with respect to mineral
operations.
43 C.F.R. § 3809.0-2 (1992).
314. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-87 (1988).
315. Id. The Forest Service Regulations, 36 C.F.R. §§ 228.4, 228.8 (1992), adopted
under the Forest Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 475-82, 551 (1988), set forth the rules
and procedures under which mining operations on the surface of National Forest Land are to
be conducted so as to minimize any adverse environmental impact on surface resources. See
Stanley Dempsey, Forest Service Regulations Concerning the Effect of Mining Operations on
Service Resources, 8 NAT. RESOURCEs LAWYER 481 (1975); Jerry L. Haggard, Regulation of
Mining Law Activities on Federal Lands, 21 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 349, 365-76 (1975);
Randy L. Parcel, Federal, State and Local Regulation of Mining Exploration, 22 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 405 (1976).
Under the National Environmental Policy Act every major federal action significantly
affecting the quality of the environment requires that a federal agency study and prepare a

1993]

RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

has since been qualified and redefined by the Surface Resources and

Multiple Use Act ("SRMUA") of 1955.316 Under this Act, the
miner's right of excluding others and of processing minerals became
subject to the right of the United States to manage and dispose of
surface resources and to the right of the public to enjoy the sur-

face. 31" By enacting SRMUA, Congress intended to clarify the law
and to address abuses that had occurred under the General Mining
Law. 3 18 The abuses included acts by persons locating mining claims
"with no real intent to prospect or mine but rather to gain possession
of the surface resources," 319 and acts by persons who might have had
a "legitimate intent to utilize the claim for the development of the
mineral content at the time of the location [but who] often did
not''320 engage in any significant mineral production efforts. These
abusive claims had the effect of withdrawing areas of public domain
from general public uses and of blocking public access to adjacent
tracts, water needed for grazing purposes, and valuable recreational
areas.32 1 In other cases, groups of fisherman-prospectors would locate
detailed statement on the environmental impacts of that proposed action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c)
(1988). No environmental impact statement is required on an application for a patent. See
South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir. 1980).
316. 30 U.S.C. § 612 (1989).
317. Id. The Act provides inter alia:
Rights under any mining claim hereinafter located under the mining laws of the
United States shall be subject, prior to issuance of patent therefor, to the right of
the United States to manage and dispose of the vegetative surface resources thereof
and to manage other surface resources thereof ....
Any such mining claims shall
also be subject, prior to issuance of patent therefor, to the right of the United
States, its permittees, and licensees, to use so much of the surface thereof as may be
necessary for such purposes or for access to adjacent land: Provided, however, That
any use of the surface of any such mining claim by the United States, its permittees
or licensees, shall be such as not to endanger or materially interfere with prospecting, mining or processing operations or uses reasonably incident thereto.
Id. § 612(b) (emphasis added).
318. The purpose of [this legislation] is to permit multiple use of the surface resources of our public lands, to provide for their more efficient administration, and to
amend the mining laws to curtail abuses of those laws by a few individuals who
usually are not miners. At the same time, the measure faithfully safeguards all of
the rights and interests of bona fide prospectors and mine operators. In no way
would it deprive them of rights and means for development of the mineral resources
of the public lands of the United States under the historic principles of free enterprise and private ownership of the present mining laws.
S. REP. No. 554, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1955).
319. United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th. Cir. 1980).
320. Id.
321. Id. Recently, the General Accounting Office ("GAO") also reported that an examination of 240 randomly selected claims showed that 239 were not being mined at the time of
GAO visits, and that there was no evidence that any mineral extraction had ever taken place
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a good stream, stake out successive mining claims flanking the
stream and proceed to enjoy their own private fishing camps.3 21
"Hunter-prospectors" would also block-out "mining claims" which
embraced wildlife habitats. 323 Under SRMUA, the claimant may
mine to the extent that such activities do not unreasonably degrade
surface resources and the claimant's right to exclude others extends
only to other potential claimants as to the site of the actual mining
operations, but no further, as "any member of the public is free to
picnic on the claim, sleep on it, or watch tumbleweeds blow across

it.,,3 24

The right of excluding others under a mining claim has been
further qualified by the Multiple Mineral Development Act of
1954,325 which provides that the same tract of public land can be
developed concurrently under the General Mining Law and the Mineral Leasing Act.328 This means that the United States can grant
leases for mining of fuel minerals in the same land in which mining
claimants explore for non-fuel minerals.
Under the FLPMA, a miner may even be excluded from areas
otherwise open to mineral exploration. 2 7 A miner can be denied a
right of access to a claim in order to "prevent unnecessary or undue
degradation of the lands." 32 8
Other laws enacted since 1872 limit the right of a claimant to
destroy or injure the land in which a claim is located, although it is
doubtful that this right ever inhered in the mining claim, since a
on 237 claims. GAO REPORT No. B-i 18678 (1989). The GAO estimated that no minerals had
ever been extracted in 197,000 of the estimated 200,000 claims filed in ten counties in the four
western states it studied. Id. In an examination of 93 randomly selected claims that had been
patented, the GAO found that only seven were being mined, while 66 were put to no apparent
use. Id. Twenty of the patented claims were being used for non-mining purposes, including
resorts, junkyards, a shopping center and even a house of prostitution. Id.; see also LESHY,
supra note 14, at 49-67.
322. LESHY, supra note 14, at 65-66.
323. See id. at 66.
324. United States v. Fahey, 769 F.2d 829, 837 (1st Cir. 1985); see also Silbrico Corp.
v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 333, 337 (10th Cir. 1989) (surface encroachment upon an unpatented lode
mining claim did not impede the claim owner's mining operations); United States v. CurtisNevada Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 1980) ("limit[ing] the exclusive possession
of mining claimants so as to permit the multiple use of the surface resources of the claims
prior to the patenting of the claims, so long as that use did not materially interfere with prospecting or mining operations").
325. 30 U.S.C. § 521 (1988).
326. Id.
327. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1988).
32& Id.; see also 43 C.F.R. § 3809.0-1 (1992).

19931

RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

mining claim gave only the right to possess for purposes of extracting minerals, and did not give title to the land. As described
earlier, under SRMUA," 9 miners are prohibited from removing vegetative resources from the area within the claims except to the extent
required for the claimant's mining operations. One court has interpreted the provisions of SRMUA to give the government the power
to decide the optimal and least destructive methods of mining, even
if the methods chosen preclude fruitful mining or result in substantially greater burdens to the claimant. In United States v. Richardson," 0 the mining claim holders filed notices of location for six mining claims in the Wind River Ranger District, in the Gifford Pinchot
National Forest in the State of Washington.3 3 1 "The claims were situated at the confluence of Slide Creek and the East Fork of the
Lewis River, an area reforested after a destructive fire some forty
years ago."' 33 2 The miners explored and prospected their claims by
use of heavy equipment and by blasting. 3 Approximately 1.6 acres
of land were affected by the surface disturbance created by bulldozing of three separate acres.33 "From the early days of these activities, forest rangers remonstrated with the miners respecting the excessive and unnecessary surface and environmental damage caused
by their methods of prospecting and suggested core drilling as an
alternative."' 3 5 However, the miners did not heed to these suggestions.33 "Ultimately [an] action was filed to enjoin further blasting
3 7
and bulldozing and to restore surface damage.1 1
The miners had expended approximately $40,000 in developing
the mine. 38 They maintained that they used methods best-suited for
the purpose of removing the overburden and for uncovering the ore
body.33 9 Because the mineral prospect was, at best, a low grade copper deposit, it was essential to determine that a large body of ore for
commercially feasible mining existed. 40 The report written by the
government's expert geologist justified continued exploration and
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

See supra notes 316-25 and accompanying text.
599 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 290.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 291.

Id.
Id.
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found that "[tfhe only acceptable initial approach to exploration of
the type [of] deposit [at issue] would be core drilling after performance of all applicable surface geotechnical surveys." 8 4 Nonetheless,
the District Court rendered judgment for the government, holding
that the "[s]tripping away [of] over burden to expose rockbed, particularly in the initial exploration stages, [was] not proper mining
procedure, under the circumstances of [the] case." 84 2 Instead, the
mining techniques employed, blasting and bulldozing, were destructive to the surface resources and, therefore, were an unreasonable
method of exposing subsurface deposits. " 3 Accordingly, the court
held that the Forest Service could require the use of only
nondestructive methods of prospecting. 4 4
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the SRMUA speaks of
"'the right of the United States to manage and dispose of the vegetative resources thereof and to manage other surface resources
thereof.' It limits such control so 'as not to [e]ndanger or
[m]aterially interfere with prospecting, mining . . . or uses
[r]easonably incident thereto.' "I" "It also . . . precludes the exploitation of surface resources by a locator 'except to the extent
[r]equired for . . . prospecting, mining . . . and uses [r]easonably

incident thereto.' "36 In light of these provisions, the Ninth Circuit
held that the District Court's findings reflected a correct interpretation of the statute. 4 7
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 295.
346. Id.
347. Id; see also United States v. Doremus, 888 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1989). In Doremus,
the claimants maintained that the Forest Service Regulations did not apply to their mining
operations. Id. at 631. The regulations required all miners to submit an operating plan before
commencing mining operations. Id. The plan at issue provided that "'the area[s] of exploration would be concentrated to the clear cut, and that no more than five trenches would be open
at any one time.' " Id. (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(k) (1987)). Furthermore, the plan provided that the cutting of live, green trees for firewood would be prohibited, and that "'if
timber is needed [the] operator is asked to cut small dead timber.'" Id. The plan neither
expressly authorized, nor expressly prohibited, the removal of live trees to be used in the mining operation. Id. On several occasions, the Forest Service representatives visited the site and
observed multiple open trenches, many of substantial size, crisscrossing more than 1.25 acres,
trees that had been pushed over "and a road that had been constructed through the trees on
one side of the claim." Id.
Claimants maintained that their operations were exempt from the regulations by the proviso which states: "[n]othing in this part shall preclude activities as authorized by ... the U.S.
Mining Laws Act of 1872 as amended." Id. at 632 (citing 36 C.F.R. § 261.1(b) (1992)). The
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Uses that are otherwise injurious to the environment are prohibited by the Mining in the Parks Act.34 8 This statute was enacted in
1976 to eliminate most national park areas from mineral exploration
and development,3 49 leaving open six national areas for mineral development: Crater Lake National Park, Mount McKinley National
Park, Coronado National Memorial, Organ Pipe Cactus National
Monument, Death Valley National Monument, and Glacier Bay National Monument.15 0 But Congress declared that,
all mining operations in areas of the National Park System should
be conducted so as to prevent or minimize damage to the environment and other resource values, and, in certain areas of the National Park System, surface disturbance from mineral development
should be temporarily halted while Congress determines whether or
not to acquire any valid mineral rights which may exist in such
35
areas. 1
Since enactment of this act, the National Park Service ("NPS")
has reported to the General Accounting Office ("GAO") that their
regulations prevent unnecessary surface disturbance and minimize
court pointed out that the Surface Resources and Multiple Use Act of 1955, which amended
the general mining law, reserved to the United States the right to manage and dispose of
surface resources on unpatented mining claims and prohibited the removal of vegetative surface resources "[e]xcept to the extent required for the mining claimant's prospecting, mining
or processing operations and uses reasonably incident thereto ... or to provide clearance for
such operations or uses." Id. (citing Surface Resources and Multiple Use Act, 30 U.S.C.
§ 612(c) (1988)). In this respect, the regulations were not inconsistent with the mining law
and claimants activities therefore were not exempt from the regulations. Id.
348. Mining in the Parks Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1912 (1988). Section 1902 provides
in pertinent part:
[aIll activities resulting from the exercise of valid existing mineral rights on patented or unpatented mining claims within any area of the National Park System
shall be subject to such regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior as he
deems necessary or desirable for the preservation and management of those areas.
Similar laws have been enacted to assess the environmental harm posed by coal mining.
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, regulates coal mining on nonfederal lands. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988). The Act "embodies Congress' recognition that
the expansion of coal mining to meet the Nation's energy needs makes even more urgent the
establishment of appropriate standards to minimize damage to the environment and to the
productivity of the soil and to protect the health and safety of the public." In re Permanent
Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 653 F.2d 514, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that the Act
gave the Secretary rule-making power to prescribe minimum information requirements for
permit applications submitted to state regulatory agencies).
349. 16 U.S.C. § 1901.
350. H.R. REP.No. 1428, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2487, 2492-93.
351. 16 U.S.C. § 1901(b).
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adverse environmental effects.3 52 For example, in Death Valley National Monument, the area with the most mining activity, very little
surface disturbance has occurred since 1976, while mineral produc-

tion has increased.353 All mining operations within the National Park
System are subject to NPS regulations which require that each mining operator develop a plan of operation in cooperation with the
NPS. 54 The regulations describe the constraints under which miners
must operate, including those relating to the potential effects of mining on air and water quality, on any endangered or threatened plant
or animal-species, and on natural and historic landmarks.3 65 The
plan must also include a reclamation plan "to ensure that the land is
returned as nearly as possible to original contours when the mine is
closed." 56
The Mining in the Parks Act has been interpreted to prohibit
the operation of heavy, off-road vehicles in Alaska's Yukon-Charley
357
Rivers National Preserve without first obtaining an access permit.
The Tenth Circuit has held that permits may be required to prevent
the unreasonable degradation of a wilderness study area, even if access to the area could not be totally denied. 5 '
352.

REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN. SUBCOMMITTEE ON MINES AND MINING, HOUSE COM-

MITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED STATES, "MINING ON NATIONAL

PARK SERVICE LANDS-WHAT IS AT STAKE?" EMD-81-119, 30-31 (1981).

353. Id. at 30.
354. Id. at 31.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d 638, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). "The Yukon-Charley
Rivers National Preserve was created and made a part of the National Park System by the
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 410hh(10) [(1988)]." Id. at
639. Vogler was a placer miner who owned "between 50 and 150 patented and unpatented
mining claims." Id. at 640. He operated a Caterpillar and a multi-ton transport vehicle along
what is "commonly called the Bielenberg trail." Id. Vogler maintained "that the marshy condition of the trail in the summer made it necessary to travel with the caterpillar alongside the
transport vehicle, off the trail. He acknowledged that this process 'raises cain' with the trail."
Id. He stated "that when he came to streams or creeks, he cut bunches of poles and trees,
making a 'bridge' so he could cross." Id. Experts testified about "uprooted trees, areas where
all the vegetation had been scraped away, and a strip about six feet wide along the side of the
trail where vegetation had been flattened by Vogler's Caterpillar. One expert noted that some
of the areas could require up to 100 years to return to their original condition." Id.
The Court found "that compliance with the Park Service's permit regulations is essential
to ensuring the protection of the Preserve's natural beauty and value." Id. at 641. The "regulations are designed to 'conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife
therein and to ... leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations."' Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1).
358. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988).
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The Wilderness Act of 1964,19 which formally established the
National Wilderness Preservation System, withdrew wilderness lands
from mineral development, although preserving valid existing
rights.3 60 The Act required periodic surveys of the mineral values in
wilderness areas by the U.S. Bureau of Mines, limited mining law
patents in wilderness areas to the minerals only (subject to "valid
existing rights"), and gave the Department of the Interior the authority to regulate mineral activity in the wilderness for the protection of the wilderness' character as "consistent with the use of the
land for mineral location and development and exploration, drilling
and production." 86 1
VII.

EFFECT OF THE PROPOSED MINERAL EXPLORATION AND

DEVELOPMENT ACT OF

1993

s
6

While the concept that the legislature holds the power to qualify
or redefine existing property rights, especially those created by statute, seems firmly established as discussed in Locke, Texaco, and Hodel, these cases also admit that the power of Congress is not limitless. 63 Instead, a redefinition that "goes too far" may be a taking,
entitling the property owner to just compensation. However, as discussed earlier, the monuments for determining when this point is
reached seem more apparent than real. 6 "
A.

Holding Fee, Royalty, and Duration of Claim

The proposed Act assesses a fee per acre (starting at five dollars) on all mining claims, and charges royalties on minerals extracted starting at eight percent.366 Currently, a claimant pays noth359. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1988).
360. The Act by its terms was to be applied prospectively to mineral leasing, becoming
effective on January 1, 1984. Id. § 1133(d)(3).
361. Id. For example, with respect to access to mining claims, the regulations provide:
Persons with valid mining claims wholly within National Forest Wilderness shall be

permitted access to such surrounded claims by means consistent with the preservation of National Forest Wilderness which have been or are being customarily used
with respect to other such claims surrounded by National Forest Wilderness. The
Forest Service will, when appropriate, issue permits which shall prescribe the routes
of travel to and from the surrounded claims or occupancies, the mode of travel, and
other conditions reasonably necessary to preserve the National Forest Wilderness.
36 C.F.R. §§ 228.15(c), 293.13 (1992).
362. H.R. 322, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
363. See supra part V.A.
364. See supra part V.A.
365.

See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
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ing for his claim or the minerals extracted, but, in order to obtain a
patent, he must demonstrate that he has expended at least $100 per
year in labor or improvements or a total of $500 on the claim. 66 The
proposed assessment would apply to existing as well as to future
claims. 3 7 A property interest, which at its creation entitled the
owner to the complete enjoyment of the fruits and profits, is being
redefined as one in which the fruits and profits must be shared. However, the effect of the proposed redefinition may be viewed not as
denying the claimant any fundamental rights inhering in the property, but as a form of user or impact fee 368 since, under the proposed
legislation, all fees and royalties derived from mining operations are
to be held in a fund for the purpose of assuring clean-up and preservation.3 69 There is an apparent rational relationship between the assessment of a fee and the costs of the benefits conferred or harmful
effects of mining activities. Numerous reports and studies show
harmful environmental effects from hardrock mining. 10 The only issue may lie in the amount of the fee, whether it is purely arbitrary
or founded upon some scientific estimates.
Under the current rules, a mining claim arises upon the discovery of a "valuable mineral deposit" which is defined as one for which
a person of ordinary prudence would be justified in the further expenditure of his labor and means with a reasonable prospect of success in developing a mine.37 To preserve the claim, a claimant need
only expend $100 worth of labor or improvements per year.37 2 The
claim otherwise continues so long as it is mined. 3 Under the proposed legislation, a claimant must, in addition, actually produce ore
366. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
367. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
369. Section 104 of the proposed legislation provides for the distribution of receipts:
[R]eceipts from royalties . . . shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States.
Twenty five percent thereof shall be paid ... to the State within the boundaries of
which the locatable mineral deposits are or were located, 25 percent shall be deposited in the Hardrock Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund ....
25 percent shall be
deposited into the Hardrock Mining Impact Assistance Trust Fund ....
and 25%
thereof shall be deposited as miscellaneous receipts in the Treasury. Upon termination of Abandoned Reclamation Fund, 33 percent of such royalties shall be paid [by
the Secretary of the Treasury to the States], 33 percent shall be deposited in the
Hardrock Impact Assistance Trust Fund ... , and 34 percent shall be deposited as
miscellaneous receipts in the Treasury.
370. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
371. E.g., Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1963).
372. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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in paying or commercial quantities within twenty years, or else the
claim is deemed abandoned. These provisions make no allowance for
the difficult, although promising, mining claim. If the twenty year
period does not reflect the actual experience of miners and may be
extinguished without regard to any variables, the provision may not
meet the test under Locke and Texaco that the extinguishment not
be arbitrary and the conditions for continued ownership not be
unreasonable.3 "4
B.

Withdrawal of Opportunity to Patent

Under the proposed legislation, all mining claims, including
those existing at the effective date of the Act, will remain mere
claims with the right to mine, but without the right to exclude the
public or the government from the area in which the claim is located. 7 51 Thus, a mining claim has been redefined as a property interest more akin to a servitude, which gives the right to possess, but
which cannot lead to the acquisition of title. 376 Congress' objective in
this is quite clear-by withdrawing the opportunity to patent, claimants will be forced to abandon the lands once the claims have been
exhausted or they are unable to produce commercial quantities of
ore. The repeal of the patent provisions of the mining law by the
proposed legislation is not the first direct attempt by Congress to
limit fee titles in public lands stemming from mining claims. Almost
from the time of passage of the General Mining Law, the government has withdrawn particular lands from mineral exploration in order to protect federal interests, such as the integrity of military installations, Indian reservations, wildlife and other environmental
3 77
concerns.
374. See supra part VI.A.
375. See H.R. 322, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1993).
376. See id.
377. See MICHAEL BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 119-25 (cited
in LESHY, supra note 14, at 31). By approximately 1910, several million acres had been withdrawn and closed to mining. LESHY, supra note 14, at 31. The first withdrawals were accomplished by executive order, rather than legislative act. Id. The executive's power to withdraw
lands was challenged and decided in United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
The Supreme Court found that the "rules or laws for the disposal of public land are necessarily general in their nature [such that] conditions may so change as to require [land to be
withheld] in the public interest." Id. at 474. In this case, the Court found that Congress had
given the power to withhold lands to the executive branch by implication. Id. By 1919, about
50 million acres had been withdrawn; 40 million of which were coal lands; nearly 7 million
were oil lands; almost all of the remaining acres were phosphate lands. See 58 CONG. REC.
4784 (1919) (statement of Sen. Walsh). On other occasions in mining law history, Congress
has withdrawn areas or substances from the privileges offered by the 1872 mining law. Under
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The questions concerning withdrawal of public lands and the
opportunity to obtain a patent (based upon claims existing at the
time of passage of the Sawtooth Act) were raised, but not settled, in
Freese v. United States.37 8 There, the plaintiff owned five unpatented

mining claims located on federal land. 7 9 In 1972, Congress incorporated these lands into the newly established Sawtooth National Rec-

reation Area. 8 " Like the proposed Mineral Exploration and Devel-

opment Act of 1993, the Sawtooth Act expressly terminated the
ability of existing claimholders to obtain a patent to lands in which
the claims were located.3 8 1 The plaintiff maintained that denial of
the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, lands previously open to location and patent became available solely on a lease basis. 30 U.S.C. § 193 (1992). However, previously located valid claims
which were in existence on February 25, 1920 were protected and the Act allowed such claims
to continue to qualify for patents so long as they are "maintained in compliance with the laws
under which initiated, which claims may be perfected under such laws, including discovery."
Id. The Act enacted in 1920 removed deposits of oil, gas, coal, phosphate, and sodium from
the general mining law and added them to the Mineral Leasing Act. Id. The Materials Act in
1947, authorized the Secretary of the Interior to sell materials including, but not limited to,
sand, stone, gravel, yucca, manzanita, mesquite, cactus, common clay, and timber or other
forest products, on public lands of the United States. 30 U.S.C. § 601 (1992). By amendment
in 1955, "common varieties" of stone, sand, gravel, cinder and pumice were removed from the
general mining law and made subject to purchase only. Id. § 611. In 1960, various asphalt
deposits were removed from the general mining law and added to the Mineral Leasing Act. Id.
§ 181.
Under the Surface Resources and Multiple Use Act of 1977, Congress declared certain
lands to be unsuitable for mining, including: lands within the National Park or National Wildlife Refuge systems, federal lands within a national forest, areas in which mining might adversely affect a designated historic site, or within 300 feet of occupied dwellings, public
schools, or churches. 30 U.S.C. § 1272 (1992). Congress, however, limited the application of
the surface mining proscriptions to avoid infringement of existing property rights. Id. The Act
provided: "After [the enactment of this Act], and subject to valid existing rights no surface
coal mining operations except those which exist on [the date of enactment of this Act] shall be
permitted ....
Id. § 1272(e).
In 1974, Congress gave recognition to the public interest by protecting the wilderness
through the Wilderness Act of 1974, which prohibited large regions from becoming new mining claims after 1983 and imposed restrictions on the occupancy and use of pre-existing mining
claims. See 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (1985). The National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978 provided for an absolute prohibition against dredge or placer mining "within the banks or beds of
the main stem of the St. Joe [River] and its tributary streams in their entirety above the
confluence of the main stem with the North Fork of the river." 16 U.S.C. § 1274(a)(23)
(1992). The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), 16 U.S.C.
§ 410hh-5 (1988), formally withdrew federal lands in Alaska from all forms of mineral activity. Finally, the Sawtooth Act, discussed in Freese v. United States, 639 F.2d 754 (Ct. Cl
1981), withdrew the right to patent in withdrawn national park land. 16 U.S.C. § 460aa to
460aa-14 (1988).
378. 639 F.2d 754 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
379. Id.
380. 16 U.S.C. § 460aa (1992).
381. The Act provided that, "[s]ubject to valid existing rights, all Federal lands located
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the ability to obtain patents upon the five unpatented mining claims
which plaintiff held on the effective date of the Act amounted to an
unconstitutional taking of property. 82 The plaintiff argued that a
"vested right to a patent" arose upon discovery and location of a
mining claim.3 83 The plaintiff meant that this "vested right" to patent was a property interest, as much as a mining claim or a fee simple title. The court rejected the plaintiff's takings argument, explaining that a vested right to the issuance of a patent "does not arise
until there has been full compliance with the extensive procedures
set forth in the federal mining laws." 84 Since the "plaintiff had not
yet taken the first step towards obtaining patents" before the passage
385
of the Act, no private property had been taken.
The holding in Freese is logical and flawless as to the issue it
addressed. However, the issue the court addressed was clearly not
the one raised by the plaintiff. The court ruled on the right to the
issuance of written evidence of title (the patent) upon completion of
an application. The plaintiff argued for a right to submit an application for a patent.3 8 The court ruled correctly that only a completed
application entitles a mining claimant to a patent, but it did not appear to grasp the gist of the plaintiff's theory, that is, the opportunity
to file an application for a patent is a property interest protected by
the Fifth Amendment. In any event, the issues in Freese could not be
decided solely by reference to Wilbur v. United States ex rel.
8
3 88 notwithstanding the
Krushnic.1
7 There, as discussed earlier,
withdrawal of certain minerals from exploration by the Mineral Leasing
Act, the holder of a claim covering the withdrawn minerals existing
at the time of enactment of the statute was entitled to a patent upon
application by virtue of a clause saving existing mining claims from
extinguishment.3 89 To the extent that the language of the savings
clause under the Sawtooth Act in Freese is similar to that in Wilbur
in the recreation area are hereby withdrawn from all forms of location, entry, and patent
under the mining laws of the United States." 16 U.S.C. § 460aa-9 (1992). The Act further
provided that "[pjatents shall not hereinafter be issued for locations and claims heretofore
made in the recreation area under the mining laws of the United States." Id. § 460aa- 11.
382. Freese, 639 F.2d at 757.
383. Id. at 758.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 755.
387. 280 U.S. 306 (1930).
388. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
389. Wilbur v. United States ex. rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306, 314 (1930).
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(as well as in Seldovia Native Ass'n v. Lujan),"9° an existing mining
claim should be interpreted to give the claimant the right to file an
application for a patent and the right to the issuance of a patent
upon completion of the application. 9 1 But the withdrawal provisions

of the Sawtooth Act in Freese go further than those in the Mineral
Leasing Act in Wilbur and the ANCSA in Seldovia. The Sawtooth
Act, by express terms, extinguished the inchoate right to patent,
even as to claims preserved by the savings clause. 92 This is precisely
the effect of the proposed legislation. While one might conclude that

Wilbur implicitly held that a right to apply for a patent inheres in a
mining claim, the question whether extinguishment of this right (in
the same way that denying a fee owner the right to possess the prop-

erty) so interferes with the claimant's expectations as to effect a taking was not before the Court., 93
390. 904 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1990).
391. The Supreme Court's dicta in Stockley v. United States would seem to support a
conclusion that in the absence of a savings clause, a non-vested interest in government largess
could be withdrawn at Congress' will. See Stockley v. United States, 260 U.S. 532, 536
(1923).
392. 16 U.S.C. § 460aa-1l.
393. Compare Clawson v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 366 (1991). The plaintiff argued
that a taking occurs when the government removes the opportunity to patent by withdrawing
lands from public exploration. Id. at 369. At issue was the Central Idaho Wilderness Act
("CIWA"), 16 U.S.C. § 1274(a)(24), enacted in 1980, which incorporated various sections of
the Salmon River in Idaho into the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System. The Forest
Service of the Department of Agriculture determined that under the Act, mining near tributaries of the Salmon River could take place only outside of their "perceptible banks above ordinary high water." Id. at 368. In 1981, Clawson "staked out a placer mining claim adjacent to
Silver Creek, a tributary of the Salmon River." Id. To proceed with mining activities on his
claim, Clawson submitted a plan of operations to the Forest Service. Id. The Forest Service
commenced a study to assess the environmental risks of the proposed mining operation and
concluded that subject to minor modifications, the plan "would not have a significant adverse
effect on the environment." Id. But before Clawson could commence operations, the Idaho
Environmental Council and the State of Idaho brought suit to enjoin him from proceeding and
to force the Forest Service to rescind its approval of the mining plan. Id. The petitioners
maintained that the CIWA prohibited all placer and dredge mining within the watershed of
any tributary to the Middle Fork of the Salmon River, rather than just inside the perceptible
banks of these tributaries below their ordinary high water marks. Id.
The District Court held for the environmental group, ruling that "the Central Idaho Wilderness Act of 1980 prohibited as of the effective date of [the] Act dredge and placer mining
in any form within the watershed and drainage area of the Middle Fork of the Salmon River
and all of its tributaries." Id. at 369. Because the claim was clearly within the watershed of
Silver Creek, a tributary of the Salmon River, the court required the forest service to rescind
its approval of plaintiff's mining operation located in the same area. Id. Clawson did not appeal this ruling, but filed suit alleging among other things a taking of his claim without just
compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. The court easily rejected Clawson's
complaint on the ground that he never acquired any property interest in the land or to the
minerals in place because the mining claim was not established until after the lands had been
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Even assuming that the opportunity to obtain a patent is property, one must consider the extent of constitutional protection due. Is
it an interest in government largess, like welfare benefits, which can
be withdrawn, but only after the recipient has been given notice of
the impending withdrawal and an opportunity to be heard on the
issue? Or, is it a more substantial interest, the withdrawal of which
requires compensation? If it is the latter, that is, an aspect of a right
inhering in the mining claim, or a property interest which vests upon
the discovery of valuable mineral deposits (the opportunity thereby
losing its character as a mere expectation in the continued availability of government largess), then substantive rights are at issue.
C.

Permissible Uses

On its face, the proposed Act does not regulate mining claims to
the point of leaving no economically viable use, although this fact
can only be determined by an examination of the costs of the recla39 4
mation requirements in relation to particular mining activities.
withdrawn by the CIWA. Id; see also Fixel v. United States, 26 F.2d 353 (Cl. Ct. 1992)
(mining claims acquired after passage of CIWA).
394. See Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In
Whitney, the court held that the operation of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act ("SMCRA"), which prohibited surface mining of alluvial valley floors, constituted a taking of the coal property where the property had only one use and that use was prohibited by
the Act. Id.
The Court of Claims addressed the same issue in Ainsley v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 394
(1985). There, the plaintiff alleged that a combination of two acts of Congress resulted in a
taking of her property without just compensation. Id. at 395. In 1978, Congress authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to establish the Friendship Hill National Historic Site. Id. The site
would be a part of the National Park System. Id.
The Act also appropriated the necessary funds to acquire the property for the park.
Pursuant to the Act, the Secretary acquired certain properties on December 27,
1979, including the surface property which overlies plaintiff's coal property. [Accordingly, t]his property was made a part of the Friendship Hill National Historic
Site.
As a result of [the] defendant's purchase of the land overlying the plaintiff's
coal property, and the placement of that land in the Friendship Hill National Historic Site, [the] plaintiff contend[ed] that her coal property [was] within the boundaries of the National Park System. As such, [the] coal property [was] subject to the
prohibition on surface coal mining operations set out in the [Surface Mining] Act.
At the time of the passage of the Surface Mining Act and the creation of the
Friendship Hill Historic Site, [the] plaintiff maintained that neither any coal mining
operations existed on her property nor had she applied for or obtained a permit for
mining coal.
Id. at 396-97. The plaintiff maintained that the mining of coal on her land was the only
beneficial use for her coal property. Id. at 397. She alleged that the Acts reduced the value of
her land to zero, which constituted a taking without just compensation. Id.
The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the
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While the requirement that money be spent is not, in and of itself, a
taking of property, the result may be different where the expenditures exceed the value of the property. 9 That issue, as it related to

the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978,396 was
addressed in Atlas Corp. v. United States.3 97 In Atlas, "the plaintiffs
sought recovery of costs associated with the stabilization of mill tail-

ings that were generated from the uranium and thorium production
under the completed contracts with the government."3 98 The court

dismissed the contract claim, finding no contractual agreement as to
the matters at issue

99

The plaintiffs also argued that the statute's

requirement of spending large sums of money for reclamation and
decommissioning of the tailings and its mill upon termination of its
license was a taking.40 0
The court found that plaintiffs had "not alleged a physical tak-

ing of any of its property" inasmuch as the government action did
not invade or permanently appropriate the plaintiff's property for
public use and that "[r]equiring money to be spent is not a taking of
property.

40

'

Nor was there a regulatory taking. 0 2 The Act served

ground that there was a definite question of fact, the resolution of which might entitle the
plaintiff to the relief she requested. Id. One of those questions was whether the exceptions
under 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) applied. Id. The exceptions included the existence of mining operations on the site on August 3, 1977, and/or the establishment of valid existing rights to mine
her property. Id. at 398. Although plaintiff admitted that her property had never been mined,
the court noted that the definition of "valid existing rights" is not cut and dried and thus
plaintiff might possibly have had such rights. Id. at 400.
The court noted that the 1983 definition of "valid existing rights" appeared to be broader
than the 1979 version and that the definition was evolving. Id. at 398. As such, the court
believed that the agency should be given the opportunity in the first instance to apply the
proper regulatory provision in determining the plaintiff's right to mine. Id. Thus, the court
concluded that the plaintiff's taking claim could not be resolved until an administrative decision was reached regarding her "valid existing rights" and rights to mine her property. Id. at
400. These points led the court to consider the second basis for the defendant's motion to
dismiss, i.e., that the claim was not ripe for judicial resolution because the plaintiff had failed
to exhaust her administrative remedies (to request a variance or waiver) set out in the Act and
regulations. Id. at 402. The court concluded that the plaintiff should have initially sought an
agency determination. Id. at 403.
395. United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 n.9 (1989).
396. Pub. L. No. 95-604, 92 Stat. 3021 (codified as amended in scattered section of 42
U.S.C. The Act provided that the federal government had the responsibility for the stabilization and decommissioning of mill sites and required that operators of mills conduct their business in a manner that would not expose the public to harm. See 42 U.S.C. § 2022 (1988).
397. 895 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990).
398. Id. at 748-49.
399. Id. at 749.
400. Id. at 756.
401. Id.
402. Id.
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to safeguard "the public against potential hazards of tailings radiation and radon gas emissions by requiring the owners and operators
of uranium mills to stabilize the tailings and mill site to minimize
the health hazards."40 3 While the costs would mean that the plaintiffs would be deprived of the use of large amounts of money, they
404
had failed to allege that the costs exceeded the value of the mill.
They also did not claim that the government had interfered with
their production of uranium or that the government had made use of
their mills unprofitable.4 0 Moreover, the plaintiffs failed to show any
interference with their investment-backed expectations because, from
the outset of the uranium procurement program, in light of the regulation of the nuclear industry, the plaintiffs should have expected
that the legislative scheme would be "buttressed by subsequent
amendments to achieve the legislative end."4 0 6
In the hardrock mining context, claimants have argued unsuccessfully that the application of certain environmental laws to mining activities have effected a taking of property. For example, in
Rybacheck v. United States,4 °7 the plaintiffs, owners and operators
of a gold placer mine, sought recovery from the government for deprivation of property consisting of 255 acres of patented claims and
twenty-one unpatented mining claims. 40 8 The plaintiffs contended
that the limitations and conditions on discharges imposed by the Environmental Protection Act and the Clean Water Act forced them to
curtail the hydraulic removal of overburden and made mining the
property unprofitable. 0 9 They argued that mining was the only economically viable use of their land, that the land could be successfully
mined only by means of hydraulic removal of overburden, and that
the cost of mining under the permit restrictions far exceeded the
value of any gold extracted.4 10 The government asserted that the
plaintiffs were not deprived of economically viable use of their property.41 ' The government reasoned that the plaintiffs had, in fact,
mined their land continuously, admitted only to losing their subsur403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.

Id. at 757 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7901).
Id. at 758.

Id.
Id.
23 CI. Ct. 222 (1991).
Id. at 223.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 224.
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face rights, and had retained their water rights.4 12
The court applied the three-factor regulatory takings test." s
First, with respect to the character of the government action, the
court inquired "whether the government act closely parallele[d] an
act of eminent domain. . . . [with t]he central question [being]
whether the act [was] equivalent to the physical invasion of substantial rights held in the property."'' "These rights include the right to
possess, use, and dispose of the property, as well as the right to exclude others."'1 5 In this case, the plaintiffs claimed that they were
deprived of a substantial use of their property.116 "However, [because] their rights to possess, dispose, and exclude others [were] not
directly affected[,] . . . the character of the government action...
[was] not equivalent to the physical destruction or intrusion of an
act of eminent domain."' 1 7 "This factor, as a matter of law, weighed
against finding a taking of the plaintiffs' land."' 1 8
"The second and third factors, the economic impact of the regulation and interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations, involve a comparison of the property before and after the regulation's alleged interference including a comparison of property
value."' 19 The court stated that "[tihe concern in our case is
whether the plaintiffs' right to mine gold could be 'exercised with
profit,""' 2 though the mere diminution in property value, as opposed
to the destruction of economically viable use, would not constitute a
regulatory taking. 21 The court left open the possible showing by defendant that the land was useful for purposes other than mining,
such as recreational activity. 422 However, if the only viable defense
identified by the court (namely, the ability of the plaintiffs to use the
land for recreational purposes), is removed because mining claims
can be used for mining purposes only, then the provision of the proposed legislation which impose financial costs greater that the value
4
of any ore extracted, may be a taking. '
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id;

(quoting Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 CI. Ct. 381, 391 (1988)).
at 224-25 (quoting Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 391).
at 225.
(citing Loveladies, 15 CI. Ct. at 391).

(citation omitted).
at 225-26.
see Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1984).
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Furthermore, regarding the subsurface and surface rights, the
court held that it did not follow that the plaintiffs "were not deprived of economically viable use of their property because they allege[d] that the permit restrictions interfered with only their subsurface rights." '24 Instead, the court must consider the value of the
plaintiffs' property as a whole in measuring both the severity of the

regulation's impact and
interference with reasonable investment425
backed expectations.
D.

Deference to the Legislature

Using the most recent Supreme Court regulatory takings case
as the central focus, Professor John R. Nolon attempts to offer some
analytic precision to the regulatory takings cases. 2 6 He argues that
all regulatory takings cases fit into one of four factual contexts: 1)
"public values," where regulations such as historic preservation ordi424.

Rybacheck, 23 Cl. Ct. at 225 (citing Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 18

Cl. Ct. 394, 405 (1989), affd, 926 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
425. See Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1989). In
Chemical Manufacturers, the plaintiffs contended that the cost of installation of equipment
required by the EPA was wholly out of proportion to the effluent reduction and failed to meet
the cost effectiveness test required by the Act. Id. at 178. The court refused to find that the
costs were totally disproportionate to the benefits and relied on the fact that BPT was the
lowest level in the progression of increasingly stringent technology-based requirements imposed
by the Clean Water Act. Id. at 185. This was the average of the best and Congress did not
intend that initial BPT must be "cheap." Id. at 205. In fact, Congress anticipated that BPT
would cause plant closures and the loss of 50,000 to 125,000 jobs. Id. Congressman Harsha,
speaking in the house in March 1972, called the attention of the Members to a private study
that estimated the loss of these jobs because of the 1976 date of BPT. Id. Therefore, the court
deferred to the decision of the EPA in finding that the costs were not "wholly disproportionate." Id. at 185; see also Trustees for Alaska, 749 F.2d at 552-53 (miners failed to show that
the provisions of Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments which limited the discharge of pollutants deprived them of economically viable use of their property as would support their takings claim). But see Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct.
161 (1990). There, the plaintiff was a large-scale miner of limestone. Id. at 164. Prior to the
commencement of any mining activities, Congress passed amendments to the Clean Water Act
which required a permit to conduct mining activities. Id. The plaintiff applied to the Army
Corps of Engineers for a permit, but its application was denied on the stated ground that a
permit would not be in the public interest. Id. The plaintiff argued that the denial effected a
taking of property. Id. The court first rejected the Army Corps assertion of the "nuisance
exception" to the Fifth Amendment, since rock mining of the type planned for the plaintiff's
property had never become a nuisance. Id. at 166. The court went on to apply the three-factor
regulatory takings test and found a taking. Id. The value of the property after the government
action was only nominal (falling from $10,500 per acre to $500). Id. The plaintiff purchased
the property for the sole purpose of limestone mining, and there was virtually no other business
by which the plaintiff could "recoup its investment or better, subject to the regulation." Id. at
175.
426. Nolon, supra note 177.
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nances tend to apply to a limited number of properties with historical characteristics; 2) "arbitration," where the regulatory regime
burdens and benefits many properties across a broad geographical
area and where courts give great deference to the legislature; 3)
"public injury," where regulations are designed to prevent uses
which threaten injury to public health and safety and where courts
give even more deference to the legislature; and 4) "undue burden,"
where the regulations operate to deprive an owner of a fundamental
right inhering in property, such as the right to exclude, and where
the courts give very little deference to the legislature."" Nolon continues by arguing that the "operating method" and, therefore, the
result of reviewing courts within each of these categories is
predictable. 28
As to the mining claim and the patented claim, the provisions of
the proposed legislation do not purport to destroy one of the essential
rights inhering in ownership of property (i.e., the rights to possess, to
exclude others, to use, to injure or destroy, to enjoy the fruits and
profits, and to transfer), such that they do not fall into the "undue
burden" class of cases.4 2 9 However, if the opportunity to patent is
regarded as a separate property interest, then its withdrawal would
fall into this class of cases since the effect of the legislation would be
to extinguish all fundamental rights inhering in the property interest,
and indeed the interest altogether. Those provisions of the proposed
legislation relating to reclamation seem to fall in the "public injury,"
as well as the "public values" category of cases. On the whole, considering the "unique" nature of the property at issue, that it is the
product of government largess and that the interest in regulating
harmful mining activities fall into the "public injury" type of regulatory takings cases, one should expect the courts to show great deference to the legislature's judgment in evaluating the validity of the
reclamation requirements of the proposed legislation.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The central belief of the proposed legislation is that the nation
will benefit from the curtailment of the privatization of public lands.
The assumption underlying this belief is that privatization entails
profit-maximizing use of the land, and that public ownership, in con427.
428.
429.

Id. at 25.
Id. at 29.
See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987).
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trast, means conservation and preservation for public low-impact recreational use. This premise, however, may be unfounded in the context of public lands open to mineral exploration. The existing array
of laws and regulations already deny the mining claimant as well as
the patentholder much power over their claim areas, limiting any
additional benefit to the patentholder to those that are privately recreational and aesthetic. A patentholder is not free to construct a resort hotel or factory on land within his original mining claim, although he might well build a summer cottage or grow peaches. The
latter two activities were the kind that Congress sought to foster by
the general mining law in 1872. At that time, the law reflected then
contemporary public values. Since then, public values concerning
land ownership have changed. The proposed legislation, like zoning,
environmental protection, and historic preservation laws that have
developed over the last century, contemplates a redefinition of our
conception of appropriate private rights in land. Thus, when resources were abundant and the population was relatively sparse,
mining and agricultural pursuits made sense.
Today, however, the converse is true-resources are scarce and
the erstwhile frontier well-populated. Without any doubt, mining activities threaten national interests in ecology and the environment.
Likewise, non-mining uses pose the same threat, but in ways that are
different and perhaps more severe than mining operations. They
cause waste and destruction of valuable resources on the surface of
lands embraced within claims, including timber, water, forage, fish
and wildlife. This waste, in turn, reduces recreational value. Nonmining uses also cause loss through increased expenditures for management and administration. Litter, water pollution by improper
sewage disposal, and forest fires are additional consequences of nonmining uses of public lands. 3 The question remains, though,
whether the existing laws and regulations are inadequate to confront
these threats and whether the proposed legislation will only add confusion and conflict among enforcing agencies and their goals. It has
become increasingly evident that "long-term environmental safety of
many mining activities is a function of the site itself, and not merely
of good or bad practices, [i.e.,] some locations cannot be mined without creating permanent environmental damage.' 43 1 A plan which
430. United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir. 1980)
(citing HR. REP. No. 730, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1955), reprinted in 1955 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2474, 2478-79); Bales v. Ruch, 522 F. Supp. 150, 156 (E.D. Cal. 1981).
431. CONG. REC. S2017 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1991) (statement of Sen. Wallop quoting
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would include the entire withdrawal of all public lands from future
mineral exploration and the aggressive enforcement of existing rules
to curtail and extinguish exhausted claims would best serve to reclaim the public domain.

former Secretary Steward L. Udall).

